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Disability, Federalism, and a Court with an
Eccentric Mission
MICHAEL H. GOTrEsMAN*
This article examines the Supreme Court's recent Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendment decisions constraining Congress'spower to impose legal obligations
on state governments. The contextfor this examination is the Court's consideration
this Term of the constitutionality of the provision of the Americans with Disabilities
Act authorizing individual suits against states by persons alleging they have been
victimized by state disability discrimination. This article was written while the fate
of the ADA case was unknown. But the Court issued its decision just as this article
was going to press. A postscript has been added describing that decision and its
implications. The article concludes that the Court's recent decisions, including the
decision just issued respecting the ADA, represent a dramatic redefinition of both
the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, and a consequent diminution of
congressional power to prevent discrimination by states against historically
disadvantaged groups in our society.
I. NTRODUCTION
A. The Consensus that Supported the Enactment of the ADA
There are occasions in the public life of the nation when the evidence of
pervasive public and private oppression of a group of citizens is so plain and so
compelling that a consensus emerges for a national response in the form of a
comprehensive federal legislative remedy--a consensus that knows no partisan
political conflict, no ideological disagreement and no federal/state divide. The
enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990 was such an
occasion.1
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author is one of the counsel for
the respondents in the Supreme Court in University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. Garrett, No.
99-1240, cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17,2000), and presented oral argument on
their behalf to the Supreme Court on October 11, 2000. As this article was about to go to press,
the Garrett case was decided. One may find this decision at No. 99-1240,2001 U.S. LEXIS 1700
(U.S. Feb. 21, 2000). The author wishes to thank his co-counsel in Garrett with whom the issues
discussed in this article have been aired at length: Ira Bumim, Mary Giliberti, Laurence Gold,
Jennifer Mathis, Deborah Mattison, Arlene Mayerson, and Sandra Reiss. The author also wishes
to thank the following for their invaluable research assistance: Anne-Marie Carstens, Julie
Lehrman, Michael Troncoso, and Joshua Vitullo.
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The ADA grew out of more than twenty years of hearings and investigations into
the deplorable public- and private-sector treatment of persons with disabilities and
their consequent deplorable situation.2 Those hearings and investigations led to the
introduction of a broadly-sponsored legislative response; two years of fine-tuning in
committee and floor deliberations eventuating in a final bill that was the product of
"[c]ompromise, carefully crafted and painstakingly wrought'; 3 and passage of the
final bill by 91-6 in the United States Senate and 377-28 in the United States House
of Representatives. 4
As the legislation moved forward, it was championed by federal and state
authorities alike. The Bush administration supported its passage, as did leaders of
both parties in Congress,5 the National Association of Attorneys General, the
National Association of Counties, the National Association of State Mental
Retardation Program Directors, and many private groups and associations.6 The ADA
marshalled this unity of action for the most compelling of reasons, as President Bush
stated in signing the ADA into law:
[T]ragically, for too many Americans, the blessings of liberty have been limited or even
denied. The Civil Rights Act of'64 took a bold step towards righting that wrong. But the
stark fact remained that people with disabilities were still victims of segregation and
discrimination, and this was intolerable. Today's legislation brings us closer to that day
when no Americans will ever again be deprived of their basic guarantee of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness.7
2 With respect to the ADA alone, Congress held eighteen hearings and sixty-three field
hearings, considered innumerable studies and reports evaluating the discriminatory treatment of
persons with disabilities and the reasons therefor, issued five committee reports, and engaged in
prolonged floor debate. Timothy Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to
Integration, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 393, 393, 414 (1991). The ADA deliberations, moreover, rested
on the institutional knowledge and expertise Congress had gained in considering and enacting prior
statutes addressing discrimination on the basis of disability. Lowell P. Weiker, Jr., Historical
Background of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 387, 387-89 (1991).
3 135 CONG. REc. 19,800 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin). See also 135 CONG. REC.
19,804 (1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (discussing the compromise that resulted in the ADA).
4 136 CONG. REc. 17,375-76 (1990) (showing Senate approval of the Conference Committee
Report); 136 CONG. REC. 17,296-97 (1990) (showing House approval of the Conference
Committee Report).
5 See 135 CONG. REC. 19,804 (1989) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 135 CONG. REc. 19,806-07
(1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 135 CoNG. REc. 19,889 (1989) (statement of Sen. Dole); 135
CONG. REc. 19,798 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
6 135 CONG. REC. 19,799 (1989). In addition, the fifty Governors' Committees advised
Congress that state laws were inadequate to deal with the problem. See infra note 297 and
accompanying text. There was no opposition to the bill from the states.
7 Remarks by the President During the Ceremony for the Signing of the Americans with
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While the ADA applies to much more than employment, this article focuses on
the provisions of the ADA banning employment discrimination. Title I of the ADA
forbids disability-based discrimination in employment. In addition to actions
motivated by negative animus, "discrimination" is defined to include a number of
practices without regard to motivation, including the failure to make reasonable
accommodation (if it can be provided without undue hardship) to the known physical
and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified employee. 8 Title I applies to both
private employers and state and local government employers.9
Title II of the ADA applies only to state and local governments.10 It forbids
discrimination with respect to programs, services, and activities, and thus ranges far
beyond employment.1 There is a circuit conflict as to whether Title II applies to
employment. 12 The Eleventh Circuit, which decided the case now before the
Supreme Court, has held that it does.13 This position is also held by the Attorney
General, who is charged with administering Title ]1.14 If that is correct, Titles I and
H[ overlap, to the extent that they both forbid employment discrimination by public
employers. The Attorney General has issued a regulation declaring that, insofar as the
titles overlap (i.e., with respect to public employment), Title I's substantive
provisions are to be interpreted in the same way as Title I's substantive provisions. 15
This does not render Title I superfluous, for it provides somewhat more generous
remedies to a victim of discrimination than are available under Title 1.16
Disabilities Act of 1990, in THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OFTHE AMERICANS WirH DISABILmEsAcr
845 (G. John Tysse ed., 1991).
8 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination); § 12112(b) (giving several
different definitions of "discriminate").
9 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (1994) (defining "employer").
10 § 1213 1(1).
11 § 12132 (prohibiting discrimination by any "public entity").
12 Compare Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816,
820 (1Ith Cir.) (holding that Title II does apply to employment), with Zimmerman v. Or. Dep't of
Justice, 170 F3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Title II does not apply to employment).
13 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 193 F.3d 1214, 1216 (1 th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
68 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. April 17,2000) (No. 99-1240), rev'd, No. 99-1240, 2001 U.S. LEXIS
1700 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2000).
14 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Service, 28
C.F.R. § 35.140 (1999). See also Section-by-Section Analysis, 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 app. A, at 491
(1999) (stating that Title II "applies to all activities of public entities, including their employment
practices").
15 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (1999). See also 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 app. A, at 491 (1999).
16 Title I declares that it is to be enforced pursuant to the remedial scheme applicable to Title
VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964.42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994). This means that compensatory
damages and punitive damages are capped at a combined total of $50,000 to $300,000, depending
on the size of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3) (1994). Title II is enforced pursuant to the
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B. The Present Peril of a Part of the ADA
Despite the unanimity of support, the fate of a part of the ADA is now in
immediate peril. The Supreme Court will decide this Term, in University ofAlabama
Board of Trustees v. Garrett,17 whether Congress exceeded its constitutional powers
by authorizing individuals to sue states alleging that the latter have violated the ADA.
This current jeopardy does not reflect a collapse of support for the ADA in the decade
since its passage. Quite the contrary, the major players in the enactment of the ADA
all have filed amicus curiae briefs with the Court in Garrett urging that the challenged
provision be upheld. Former President Bush filed one such brief, and the managers
of the ADA in Congress (Senators Hatch, Dole, Kennedy and Harkin, and
Representatives Bartlett and Hoyer) filed another. Indeed, of the twenty-one states
registering their views in amicus curiae briefs, two-thirds ask the Court to uphold the
provision subjecting them to suits by complaining individuals. 18
The peril comes not from a loss of public support for the ADA, but from the
territory staked out in recent decisions by a bare five-person majority of the current
Supreme Court, which has pursued an eccentric mission of attempting to reinvigorate
state "sovereignty" that appears to have no constituency in contemporary society.
There is reason to doubt that the consensus in the outside world supporting the
challenged ADA provision will have much influence on these Justices. Just a few
months ago, these five Justices struck down a part of the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA) 19 despite a similar consensus in Congress and a line-up of states in
amicus briefs 35-1 in favor of upholding the challenged provision.20
remedial scheme of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 under which there is no cap on the
amount of compensatory or punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1994); Olmstead v. L.C., 527
U.S. 581, 590 n.4 (1999).
17 193 F.3d 1214, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17,
2000) (No. 99-1240). The Supreme Court decided Garrett on Feb. 21, 20001; its decision is
described in a postscript to the article, infra accompanying text at notes 387-98.
18 The Attorney General of Hawaii prepared an amicus curiae brief supporting Alabama's
quest to strike down the individual-suit provision of the ADA. A draft of that brief was circulated
to the Attorneys General of all the states with invitations to join. Only six other states accepted the
invitation: Arkansas, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and Tennessee. The Attorney General of
Minnesota thereupon prepared an amicus curiae brief supporting the respondents' quest to uphold
the individual-suit provision, which was joined by thirteen other states: Arizona, Connecticut,
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North
Dakota, Vermont, and Washington. Twenty-eight states joined neitherbrief, suggesting implicitly
that they are content with (even if not ecstatic about) the ADA's provision. Otherwise, their
economic self-interest should have prompted theirjoining Hawaii's brief.
19 United States v. Morrision, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (to be published at 529 U.S. 598
(2000)) (striking down part of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)).
20 SeeMorrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1743 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Here is the root of the problem: Congress, in enacting the ADA, claimed that it
was exercising its powers under both the Commerce Clause2 l and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment 22 At the time the ADA was enacted, the governing law-
stated in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,23-was that Congress, when exercising its
Article I legislative powers, may authorize private-party suits against states to enforce
the federal law. But the Supreme Court has since overruled Union Gas, five Justices
holding, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,24 that Congress is precluded by the Eleventh
Amendment from authorizing private-party suits against states, except when
exercising its power, conferred in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
"enforce, by appropriate legislation," that Amendment's substantive provisions.25 As
long as this majority holds sway, it is not enough that Congress has power under the
Commerce Clause to enact a statute regulating the states: that will not support the
creation of a private right of action to enforce the statute.2 6 Thus, the fate of the ADA
(as of every federal statute that purports to authorize private suits against states) turns
on whether the statute is a proper exercise of Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment-the one fount of congressional power that the Court's
current majority acknowledges entitles Congress to authorize private suits.
Here is the rub: this same five-person majority has an appetite for rejecting
Congress's invocations of its Fourteenth Amendment power. In the past three years,
the Court has addressed the Fourteenth Amendment provenance of four federal
statutes and found each wanting. The Court has invalidated the entire Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),27 the provision of the Violence Against Women
Act creating a federal cause of action by which victims of gender violence can recover
damages from the perpetrators, 28 and the authorization of private-party suits against
21 US. CONST. art. , § 8, cl. 2.
22 Id. at amend. XIV, § 5.
23 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
24 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
25 US. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
26 Four members of the Court have stated that they do not accept, for stare decisis purposes,
the holding in Seminole Tribe in judging the constitutionality of statutory provisions providing for
the enforcement of valid federal law through private-party suits against the States. See, e.g., Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631,650-54 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (to be published at
528 U.S. 62 (2000)). There is some possibility that new appointments to the Supreme Court would
lead to the overturming of Seminole Tribe Two ofthose in the current four-person minority were
Republican appointees-Justice Stevens appointed by President Ford, Justice Souter by President
George H.W. Bush. Adherence to Seminole Tribe is unlikely to be a litmus test for future
appointments, even in a Republican administration.
27 City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994), because Congress claimed power
to enact RFRA only under the Fourteenth Amendment).
28 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (to be published at 529 U.S. 598 (2000))
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states under the Patent Remedy Act29 and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA).30
The courts of appeals are sharply divided on whether a similar fate awaits the
ADA.31 Not surprisingly, given the circuit conflict and its own sense of mission, the
Supreme Court has been anxious to address the ADA's Fourteenth Amendment
pedigree. Within days after the private-suit provision of the Age Discrimination
Employment Act was struck down, the Court granted certiorari to decide the validity
(striking down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994),
because the Court found the statute wanting under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment).
2 9 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(invalidating the authorization of private-party suits against states under the Patent Remedy Act,
35 U.S.C. §§ 279(h), 296(a) (1994)).
30 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (to be published at 528 U.S. 62)
(invalidating the authorization of private-party suits against states in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 and Supp. IV 1998)).
31 Five circuits have upheld the ADA's provision of private suits against the states-First
Circuit: Torres v. P.R. Tourism Co., 175 F.3d 1, 6 n.7 (1st Cir. 1999) (dictum); Second Circuit:
Kilcullen v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 77, 82 & n.7 (2d Cir. 2000) (following Muller
after Kimel and collecting cases); Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298,309-10 (2d Cir. 1999); Ninth
Circuit: Becker v. Armenakis, No. 99-35296, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12847, at *2 (9th Cir. June
8, 2000) (reaffirming Dare after Kime); Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1175-76 (9th Cir.
1999); Tenth Circuit: Cisneros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d 1113, 1124-28 (10th Cir. 2000); Eleventh
Circuit: Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying the
11th Circuit's Kimel decision); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (1lth Cir.
1998), aff'don other grounds, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
Four circuits have ruled the provision invalid-Third Circuit: Lavia v. Pennsylvania, 224 F3d
190,206 (3d Cir. 2000); Sixth Circuit: Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Ct. Com. P1., 227 F.3d 627,
641-42 (6th Cir. 2000) (to be published at 227 F.3d 627 (2000)); Seventh Circuit: Walker v.
Snyder, 213 F.3d 344,346-47 (7th Cir. 2000); Stevens v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 210 F.3d 732,740-
41 (7th Cir. 2000); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Coils. & Univs. for N.E. Ill. Univ., 207
F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000); Eighth Circuit: Fisher v. Comm'n of Veterans Affairs, No. 99-3750,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 22880, at *1-2 (8th Cir. Sept. 11, 2000) (per curiam) (affirmingDebose
after Kimel); Debose v. Nebraska, 207 F.3d 1020, 1021 (8th Cir. 1999); Alsbrook v. City of
Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Both the Fourth and the Fifth Circuits are apparently divided. Compare Amos v. Md. Dep't
of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d 212, 222-23 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding Title If a
constitutionally valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity as applied to state prisoners),
vacated and appeal dismissed, 205 F.3d 687, 688 (4th Cir. 2000) and Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136
F.3d 430,438 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding Title II a valid abrogation), with Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d
275,280 n.29, 282 (5th Cir. 2000) (questioning Coolbaugh in light of KUmel and finding 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.130(f) (1999), promulgated under Title II, an unconstitutional abrogation) and Brown v. N.C.
Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 707 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f)
(1999), promulgated under Title 11, is an unconstitutional abrogation).
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of the comparable provisions of the ADA;32 when both of those cases settled, the
Court granted certiorari in Garrett.33
C. University of Alabama-Birmingham Board of Trustees v. Garrett
Garrett is in fact two separate lawsuits that were consolidated as they traveled up
the judicial ladder. They have in common that the two plaintiffs engaged the same
law firm in Birmingham, Alabama, to represent them. The Attorney General of
Alabama represents both of the state agency defendants, and the suits were filed in
the same district court and assigned to the same judge.
The plaintiff in one case is Patricia Garrett; a seventeen-year employee of the
University of Alabama-Birmingham who had risen to the position of director of
nursing in one unit of the university's hospital. Garrett contends that she was forced
out of her job because she contracted breast cancer, notwithstanding that she
continued to perform successfully the essential functions of her job.34
The other case involves Milton Ash, a Youth Services security officer in the
Alabama Department of Youth Services (ADYS). Ash suffers from diabetes, severe
chronic asthma, and other respiratory disabilities; he is vulnerable to asthma attacks
so severe as to require hospitalization. Throughout his tenure with ADYS, Ash
requested two accommodations urged by his doctor, but which ADYS refused to
provide. First, he asked that ADYS enforce its promulgated "no-smoking" rule in the
Gatehouse-a small workspace where he often is confined with fellow workers who
smoke. Second, he asked ADYS to repair vehicles he was required to drive on the
job, as they leaked carbon monoxide into the passenger compartment Ultimately,
32 See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999) (to be published at 528
U.S. 1146 (1999)), cert. granted sub. nom. Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 120 S. Ct. 1003 (2000) (to be
published at 529 U.S. 1001 (2000)), cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1265 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (1 th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub. nom. Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. Dickson,
139 F.3d 1426 (1Ith Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1236 (2000).
33 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
34 According to Garrett's complaint, an affidavit she filed before the suit was dismissed, and
deposition testimony elicited from her by the state, upon discovery of her cancer, Garrett had a
lumpectomy and node removal and continued working for several months during radiation and the
start of chemotherapy, then taking leave until the completion of her chemotherapy. Her complaint
alleges that her immediate supervisor, the associate executive director of the hospital, repeatedly
threatened, prior to Garrett's taking leave, to transfer her to a less demanding position because of
her cancer. When Garrett completed her chemotherapy, and was ready to return from her leave,
the associate executive director discouraged Garrett's return. Within a week after Garrett's return,
the associate executive director forced her out of the position and into a much lower paying job,
despite Garrett's ability to perform the essential functions of the director of nursing position.
Amended Complaint at% 3, 5-14, Garrett v. Univ. ofAla. Bd. of Trs., 989 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D.
Ala. 1998) (No. CV-97-AR-0092-2); Affidavit of Patricia Garrett at% 2-1; Deposition Testimony
of Patricia Garrett at pages 154-60, 199-205, 266-70, 275-79, and 356-57.
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Ash filed an EEOC charge challenging the refusal of these accommodations. While
it was pending, Ash was diagnosed with sleep apnea, and at his doctor's urging, Ash
sought a transfer from his rotating shift to a steady day shift. This, too, was refused,
although other employees, junior to Ash, were transferred to vacancies arising on the
day shift.35
In their complaints, Garrett and Ash alleged violations of both Titles I and II of
the ADA.36 Garrett's principal claim is disparate treatment: she was removed from
her job because of her supervisor's antipathy to having a person with a history of
breast cancer in that job. Ash's principal claim is failure to provide the reasonable
accommodations he requested.37
The defendants in both cases moved for summary judgment on Eleventh
Amendment grounds, i.e., that Congress had no power to authorize private suits
against the state.38 The district court agreed and dismissed the complaints. 39 The
cases were consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit and the United States
intervened to defend the constitutionality of the private-suit provision. The Eleventh
Circuit in accordance with its earlier precedent upheld the constitutionality of the
private-suit provision and reversed the district court's dismissal of the suits40 At the
request of the state agencies, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this
ruling.41
D. Outline of This Article
The centerpiece of this article, Part II-completed while a decision in Garrett
is awaited following oral argument-is an examination of the constitutional question
35 Complaint at IN 3-14, Ash v. Ala. Dep't of Youth Services, 989 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ala.
1998) (No. CV-97-AR-2179-S); Affidavit of Milton Ash at % 2-24.
36 Amended Complaint at% 14-20, Garrett; Complaint at 15-22, Ash. Both also allege
violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). Amended Complaint at
IN 14-20, Garrett (No. 99-1240); Complaint at % 15-22, Ash.
37 Amended Complaint at% 14-20, Garrett. Garrett also claims that, upon her removal, she
was denied the reasonable accommodation of appointment to another position of comparable
stature and salary. Ash also claims that he was retaliated against for invoking his rights under the
ADA. Complaint at% 14-20,Ash..
38 Motion by the UAB Bd. of Trs. for Partial Summary Judgment, Univ. ofAla. Bd. of Trs.
v. Garrett, No. 99-1240 (filed Oct. 7, 1997 and amended Dec. 9, 1997). The motion was treated
as a motion for complete summaryjudgment by the District Court in its decision. Garrett v. Univ.
of Ala. Bd. of Trs., 989 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ala. 1998). See also Motion by Ala. Dep't of Youth
Servs. for Summary Judgment, Ash (No. CV-97-AR-2179-S) (filed Dec. 2, 1997).
39 Garrett, 989 F. Supp. 1409.
40 Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120
S. Ct. 1669 (2000).
41 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000).
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the Court will address in Garrett. As Garrett may have been decided by the time this
article is published, and in any event will be decided shortly thereafter, an article with
this limited focus would be destined for an exceptionally short "shelf-life," except
perhaps, as an artifact reflecting the strategic choices made by one of the parties
litigating before the Supreme Court. So that this article may serve a more enduring
purpose, I have surrounded the discussion of Garrett with materials that may be of
value regardless of its disposition. Part II discusses "how we got here," by tracing the
evolution of the Supreme Court's treatment of the Eleventh Amendment and of
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. As will be shown, the
current Court has changed the course of decisional law on both of these issues. After
Part Ills discussion of the issues in Garrett, Part IV explores what will be left of
Congress's efforts to forbid disability discrimination by states if the Court holds
private suits barred by the Eleventh Amendment The issues discussed in Part IV will
remain important even if the Court upholds the ADA's private-suit provision. For
those issues will arise with respect to any statute found wanting under the Eleventh
Amendment-a fate that has already befallen the Patent Remedy Act and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
If. How WE GOT HERE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COURT's EVOLVING
CONCEPTIONS OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND OF CONGRESS'S
POWER UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
This Part traces the evolution of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment; and of the Court's conception of Congress's power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment These are the necessary backdrops to understanding the
issue posed in Garrett.
A. The Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted in 1798, in reaction to the Supreme
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.42 The Court held in Chisholm that a South
Carolina citizen could sue the State of Georgia in federal court, invoking diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction, to enforce his state-law entitlement to payment by Georgia
on bonds it had issued during the Revolutionary War.4 3 Georgia would not have been
susceptible to suit in state courts, as it enjoyed sovereign immunity there.44
The effect of the Chisholm holding was that the diversity jurisdiction of the
federal courts subjected states to legal liability for breaching state-grounded
42 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
43 Id
44 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.. 1425, 1469-70
(1987).
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substantive obligations that otherwise would have been unenforceable. The states
were not amused, as many of them were obligated on war bonds they could not
comfortably pay, and had been counting on their immunity from suit in state court to
escape payment 45 At the states' insistence, the Eleventh Amendment was
promulgated by Congress and swiftly ratified by the states.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: 'The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.' 46
Historians and legal scholars have concluded, virtually unanimously, from the
language, context and "legislative history" of the Eleventh Amendment that the
Amendment was not intended to insulate states from federal court suits to enforce
federal obligations.47 Rather, its purpose was to remove federal jurisdiction over state
45 See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction ofan Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1058 n.1 14 (1983); John V. Orth, The Truth about Justice
Iredell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 73 N.C. L. REv. 255, 268 n.61 (1994) (citing
John V. Orth, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNrrED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENr IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 34-42 (1987)).
46 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
47 In addition to the articles cited in Justice Souter's dissent in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44,
110 n.8 (1996), the following articles reject the Eleventh Amendment's application to federal
question suits: Amar, supra note 44, at 1474-92; Martha Field, The Eleventh Amendment and
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978); Fletcher, supra note 45, at 1034; William Fletcher, The Diversity
Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1263
(1989); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1893 (1983); Stephen Harris Jr. and Michael Kenny,
Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence After Atascadero: The Coming Clash with Antitrust,
Copyright, and Other Causes of Action over Which the Federal Courts Have Exclusive
Jurisdiction, 37 EMORY L.J. 645,703--04 (1988); Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise
in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 1000 (2000); James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An
"Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1351 (1998);
David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 61, 68 (1984); Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling
Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHL L. REV. 1260, 1260-61 (1990); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Eleventh
Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTREDAMEL. REV. 859, 868--69 (2000); Keith Werhan, Pullman
Abstention after Pennhurst: A Comment on Judicial Federalism, 27 WM. AND MARYL. REv. 449,
460 nA6 (1986).
There are three articles expressing "minority' views cited in Justice Souter's famous footnote
eight in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 110 n.8 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting), but two
of these concede that intra-state federal question suits, i.e., those between a citizen of a state and
that state, can be heard in federal court. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the
Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1367-71 (1989); Calvin R. Massey, State
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law claims (from which states were immune in their own courts) and which were
cognizable in federal court only because of the parties' diverse citizenship.48 Justice
Iredell, the lone dissenter in Chisholm, had conceded that the states, by ratifying the
Constitution, had surrendered their sovereignty with respect to powers that the
document conferred on the federal government, and accordingly the Supremacy
Clause meant that Congress could confer federal court jurisdiction to entertain suits
to enforcefederal law against states.49 Justice Iredell's complaint was that there was
no warrant for federal jurisdiction to subject states to state law obligations to which
they had not consented. 50 The Eleventh Amendment was widely understood to have
incorporated the line drawn by Justice Iredell.51
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court in 1823 in Cohens v. Virginia,52
ratified that understanding of the limited sweep of the Eleventh Amendment declaring
that the Amendment had no effect on federal question suits and that "a case arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States is cogni[z]able in the Courts of the
Union, whoever may be the parties to that case." 53 The point of the Eleventh
Amendment, he explained, was to bar jurisdiction in suits at common law by
Revolutionary War debt creditors, not to "strip the [federal] government of the means
ofprotecting, by the instrmentality of its courts, the constitution and laws from active
violation."54
Still, the Amendment's infelicitous wording left room for future mischief By its
terms, the Amendment banned federal jurisdiction over all suits against states by out-
of-staters, but over no suits against states by in-staters. That surely was not what the
Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHL L. REv. 61, 66 (1989). Only the
third "minority" article cited in Justice Souter's footnote supports the holding in Seminole Tribe.
See William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory ofthe Eleventh Amendment. A Critical Evaluation,
102 HARV. L. REv. 1372, 1382-83 (1989).
4 8 See Fletcher, supra note 45, at 1035, 1060 ("In Chisholm, the Court held that this state-
citizen diversity clause conferred jurisdiction to hear Chisholm's damage action against Georgia
and that the clause abrogated any sovereign immunity defense to the suit that Georgia might
otherwise have had. The Eleventh Amendment was passed immediately thereafter in order to
overturn this result ... The narrowness of the Amendment's coverage and its congruence with the
affirmative authorization in Article III of state-citizen diversity jurisdiction suggest strongly that
rather than intending to create a general sovereign immunity protection from all suits by private
citizens, as the first proposal would have done, the drafters of the second and third proposals
intended only to limit the scope of that part of Article I's jurisdictional grant-the state-citizen
diversity clause-that had led to Chisholm.").
4 9 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,435-36 (1793).
50 Id. at 448-49.
51 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
52 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1823).
53 Id. at 383.
54 Id. at 407.
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drafters intended, for it would have left in-staters free to invoke federal subject matter
jurisdiction to enforce federal law against a state while denying that right to out-of-
staters-a distinction that would not make sense. Sloppy drafting thus precluded a
literal interpretation of the Amendment. Yet the wording of the Amendment, sloppy
though it be, suggests that the real target of the Amendment was state law claims. If
the drafters had intended to insulate states from all private suits, no matter whether
based on federal or state law, they would surely have adopted the alternative version
of the Amendment introduced by Representative Theodore Sedgwick:
[N]o state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any of the judicial courts,
established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United States, at the
suit of any person or persons, whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners,
or of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United States.55
That the drafters instead chose a version of the Amendment that closed the federal
courts only to citizens of other states and foreigners suggests that their eye was on the
diversity clause-a clause that would extend federal jurisdiction only to suits by those
people-and not on the (federal) subject matter clause, which could be invoked by
anyone.56
After Chief Justice Marshall's pronouncement, the Court waited seventy-seven
years before revisiting the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment But when it finally
did, in 1890, in Hans v. Louisiana,57 it sang a new tunie. Hans was an unfortunate test
case of the meaning of the Amendment. Like Chisholm, it was a suit to enforce
obligations on a state war bond, this time issued during the Civil War. But unlike
Chisholm, the claim was now cast as a federal law claim-plaintiffs claimed that in
reneging on its bonds Louisiana was violating the federal Constitution's command
that states not impair the obligations of contracts.58 Plaintiffs invoked the subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts to advance this federal claim.59 The Hans
Court, with its eye on the underlying problem that led to the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, was not about to permit legal creativity-the refashioning of the debt
claim as federal rather than state-to undo the protection against state war debts that
had animated the Amendment's adoption. Hence, the Court ruled that the Eleventh
55 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 111 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
GAzurEoFTHEUNrrED STATES, Feb. 20, 1973, at 303) (alteration in original).
56 Indeed, to jump ahead of the story, even the current majority on the Court has
acknowledged that "the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article M
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54. As will be shown, this
has not deterred the Court from using the Amendment to restrict the federal question jurisdiction
as well.
57 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
58 Id. at 1-3.
5 91d. at 9-10.
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Amendment must apply to federal causes of action, just as it does to state law
actions.60 Chief Justice Marshall's perorations to the contrary were acknowledged,
but dismissed as a rare off-day for that great man. 61
After Hans, the Eleventh Amendment lay dormant again, for another eighty-six
years, until Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1972, was
challenged for authorizing private suits against states that engage in employment
discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, or sex. In Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer,62 the Court sidestepped the broader issue by holding that, whatever the
Eleventh Amendment's significance for legislation enacted pursuant to provisions of
the Constitution that pre-dated its adoption, the Eleventh Amendment did not apply
to statutes enacted to implement the later-enacted Fourteenth Amendment. The
Fourteenth Amendment imposed legal constraints directly on states and expressly
authorized Congress to enforce the rights created therein, and this empowerment
perforce overrode whatever constraints might exist in the Eleventh Amendment 6 3 As
the state in Fitzpatrick did not dispute that Title VII was a proper exercise of
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment
was inapplicable.64
In 1987, the modem Court finally addressed the continued applicability of Hans
to statutes which, unlike Fitzpatick, were enacted pursuant to congressional powers
conferred by provisions of the Constitution that pre-dated the Eleventh Amendment
A bare majority of the Welch Court;65 conceding that the holding in Hans was
questionable, decided nonetheless to accept that holding as stare decisis. The majority
explained that whatever its correctness, Hans's effects were not "pernicious" because
there existed adequate alternative mechanisms (apart from individual suits against
states) for enforcing federal law against states.66 The other four Justices in Welch were
prepared to reverse Hans outright.67
6 0 The Court overcame the peculiar wording of the Eleventh Amendment, which would not
have barred federal law suits by in-staters, by observing that the Eleventh Amendment was
intended to reinstate the original, "correct" meaning of Article 1H of the Constitution, which had
been misconstrued in Chisholm. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11. Article MI was never intended to permit
suits of any type against states. This conception was reinstated by the Eleventh Amendment, and
so Article II itself, if not the literal wording of the Eleventh Amendment, is now to be construed
as barring federal jurisdiction over federal law suits against states by their own citizens. See id. In
the modem cases described in the text, this roundabout formulation has been collapsed, as the
Court has been talking about the Eleventh Amendment as the source of the ban on federal subject
matter jurisdiction.
61 Hans, 134 U.S. at20.
62 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
6 3 Id at 456-57.
64 Id at 456 n. 11.
65 Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468,478-79 (1987).
66Id. at 487-88. See infra Part IV for a discussion of these alternatives. They include, inter
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Two years later, in Union Gas,68 the pendulum swung again. The Court now
held that Congress has the power, when enacting legislation under Article I of the
Constitution, to "abrogate" the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity by clearly
stating such an intention. This turnabout resulted because one Justice, Byron White,
found a loophole by which he could move from the no-federal-suit camp to the other
camp without overruling Hans.69 He joined with the four dissenters in Welch to
declare that "Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of the States."70 The distinction wrought by Union Gas is this:
the mere presence of a federal claim does not empower a plaintiff to invoke the
federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction to enforce that claim-the Eleventh
Amendment stands in the way. But if Congress expressly declares that it intends to
permit the suit against states despite the Eleventh Amendment, the protection
afforded by that Amendment evaporates. In Hans, where the plaintiffs had invoked
the "impairment of contracts" clause of the Constitution unaided by an express
congressional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment, the Amendment remained a
bar. But when a federal statute confers rights and expressly authorizes private suits
to enforce them notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, as had occurred in Union
Gas, the Amendment is no longer operative.
This notion that one has a constitutional right, but that Congress can abrogate it,
is unique in the Court's jurisprudence. But it is a testament to how the unfortunate
wording and history of the Eleventh Amendment-coupled with the desperate need
to find a fifth vote to allow private suits against states-have tortured the Court's
jurisprudence. However convoluted the route, Union Gas meant that Congress could
enact Commerce Clause legislation conferring rights against states and authorize
private-party suits against states to enforce those rights. In a roundabout way, the
Supreme Court's decisional law had evolved to the point where, with a little help
from Congress, the Eleventh Amendment would be confined to its originally-
intended role of banning federal jurisdiction over state law claims against states.
Alas, this convergence with original purpose was short-lived. In 1996, just seven
years after Union Gas, but after several changes in the Court's composition, the
balance had tilted back 5-4 in the other direction.71 That bare majority expressly
alia, the right of the federal government to sue states, and the right of individuals to sue state
officials under the doctrine of Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
67 Welch, 483 U.S. at 519-21.
68 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
69Id. at57.
70 d.
71 Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White-four of the five-person majority in
Union Gas--were no longer on the Court. They had been replaced, respectively, by Justices
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The critical change was the replacement of Justice
Marshall by Justice Thomas. In all other instances, the new Justice shared the predecessor's
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overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe.72 Acknowledging that the text of the
Amendment appears limited to the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction,7 3 the majority
declared, "we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for
what it says, but for the presupposition which it confinms.' 74 That "presupposition,"
located in Hans, "has two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our
federal system; and second, that '[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without his consent.'" 75 Neither the Hans Court
in adopting this presupposition, nor the Seminole Tribe Court in embracing it,
acknowledged that our Constitution has a Supremacy Clause.
The majority's holding in Seminole Tribe garnered stinging dissents from four
Justices. 76 Indeed, these four are so contemptuous of the majority's holding in
Seminole Tribe that they have refused to accept the holding as stare decisis and have
declared their intention to dissent whenever the Court strikes down a federal statute
on Eleventh Amendment grounds:
I remain convinced that Union Gas was correctly decided and that the decision of
five Justices in Seminole Tribe to overrule that case was profoundly misguided. Despite
my respect for stare decisis, I am unwilling to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling
precedent ... [B]y its own repeated overruling of earlier precedent, the majority has
itself discounted the importance of stare decisis in this area of the law. The kind of
judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole Tribe ... represents such a radical
departure from the proper role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the
opportunity arises.77
The majority in Seminole Tribe did acknowledge, however, as the Court had
previously held in Fitzpatrick; that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits
in which states seek to enforce statutes enacted pursuant to Congress's powers under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (Civil War Amendments).78
support for the holding in Union Gas.
72 517 U.S. 44,66 (1996).
73 See supra note 56.
74 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village ofNoatak, 501 U.S.
775, 779 (1991)). This, it bears emphasis, is from the "strict construction" wing of the Court.
75 Id. (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 3 (1890) (emphasis deleted)).
76 Id. at 76-100 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 100-85 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by
Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.).
77 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,65-66 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined
by Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ.) (citations and footnotes omitted).
78 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment both confer enforcement power on Congress. They are referred to
collectively in this paper, as they are repeatedly in the Court's decisions, as the "Civil War
Amendments:'
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As a result of Seminole Tribe, Congress's invocation of its Commerce Clause
power to enact the ADA, even if proper, is not sufficient to sustain the authorization
of private suits against states. But the Fourteenth Amendment exception to Seminole
Tribe would sustain that authorization ifthe ADA is a proper exercise of Congress's
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. That is the question the Court will
decide in Garrett, and it requires that we shift our focus from the Eleventh
Amendment to the Fourteenth.
B. Evolution of the Fourteenth Amendment
What is required for a statute to be a proper exercise of Congress's power to
"enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment? It seems self-evident that Congress could
enact a statute authorizing federal court suits by individuals against states seeldng
equitable and legal relief for state violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a
statute, which would not purport to add to the substantive content of the Fourteenth
Amendment, would be the quintessential embodiment of Congress's constitutional
power to enact "appropriate" legislation to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment.
Surprisingly, Congress has never enacted such a statute. It has, to be sure, enacted a
statute that authorizes suits against "persons" who, under color of state law, deprive
individuals of their constitutional rights,79 but the Supreme Court interpreted the
word "person" in § 1983 not to include the states. 8°
If the ADA merely forbade discrimination by states against individuals with
disabilities "when such discrimination violates the Fourteenth Amendment," its
congruity with the Section 5 power would be obvious. But, of course, the ADA does
much more. It forbids a wide swathe of conduct by the states-e.g., the failure to
make reasonable accommodations-that likely does not violate the constitution unless
invidiously motivated.81 Furthermore, the ADA forbids that conduct whether or not
7 9 See Civil Action for the Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
80 Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that cities, counties, school boards, and other local governmental entities do not
enjoy the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, even though their actions are "state action"
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,281 (1977). Thus, the private-suit authorization in the ADA is not
in jeopardy as to these potential defendants, so long as the ADA is a proper exercise of either
Congress's Commerce power or its Fourteenth Amendment power.
811 say "likely does not," rather than "does not," because there is some lingering uncertainty
as to what level of scrutiny the Court will apply to disability discrimination. See infra notes 236-39
and accompanying text. If distinctions that disadvantage persons with disabilities were subjected
to heightened scrutiny, they might violate the Equal Protection Clause even if innocently
motivated. But if such distinctions are subject only to rational basis review, as the Court appeared
to hold in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), then motivation-
innocent or invidious-would be dispositive of whether most distinctions offend equal protection.
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it is invidiously motivated. Thus, the ADA forbids even innocently motivated refusals
of reasonable accommodation-i.e., those that are honestly motivated by a desire not
to incur the burden of the accommodation, rather than by a desire to avoid having to
employ a person with a disability. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the
ADA's overbreadth exceeds the power conferred upon Congress by the Fourteenth
Amendment because it forbids more than the Amendment forbids.
There is no question that some overbreadth is allowed Congress, when it finds
a serious pattern of unconstitutional behavior, both to remedy prior violations of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and to prevent future violations. 82 That was
established in a quartet of decisions issued between 1966 and 1980 upholding
provisions of the Voting Rights Act, and has been acknowledged again in a quartet
of decisions in the past four years.83 But, what predicate of unconstitutional behavior
(or threat of such behavior) must exist for Congress to resort to overbreadth, and how
much overbreadth is allowed in addressing that predicate? Answering these questions
will determine the fate of the ADA provision challenged in Garrett.
To predict those answers, it is necessary to explore in depth the two quartets of
decisions, issued in two discrete time periods, in which the Court has mapped the
breadth of Congress's enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment The first quartet spans the period 1966 to 1980-a time when 'Warren
Court" Justices still held the majority on the Court The second quartet spans the years
1997 to 2000 and is the product of the current Court whose membership has
remained constant throughout this period.
1. Quartet #1: The Foundational Decisions Articulating Congress 's
Enforcement Powers
While I will describe the quartets in chronological order, some advance warning
of where the stress-lines between the first and second quartets lie may be helpful. The
first quartet should be read with particular attention to three features of the decisions.
First, how deferential is the Court to Congress's finding that there are constitutional
violations of such magnitude as to warrant heroic legislative solutions? Second, how
deferential is the Court to Congress's judgment as to what legislative steps are
necessary to secure the protections of those Amendments? In this regard, note
particularly the Court's receptivity to Congress's choice to adopt nationwide
provisions. Finally, what "standard of review" does the Court adopt in judging the
propriety of Congress's action? Is Congress's choice to be upheld so long as it is a
82 In the discussion that follows, some cases involve Congress's power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and some cases involve Congress's power under Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment. The two provisions are identically worded, and the Court has treated
decisions under either as applicable to both.
83 See infra notes 84-204 and accompanying text.
2001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
rational choice, or is Congress held to a higher standard, akin to the "strict scrutiny"
the Court gives to legislative classifications based on race?
a. South Carolina v. Katzenbach
The first case addressing the scope of Congress's enforcement powers under the
Civil War Amendments was South Carolina v. Katzenbach,84 in which the Supreme
Court rejected a challenge by South Carolina to the constitutionality of several
provisions of the Voting Rights Act.85 Most interesting for our purposes is the
Court's disposition of the challenge to section 4 of the Act which forbade the use of
literacy tests as a voter eligibility criterion by "covered" states (in other words, states
that had a recent history of using such tests in a discriminatory fashion to block
Blacks from voting).
South Carolina argued that the Court had previously held that literacy tests are
not aper se violation of the Fifteenth Amendment even if they have the effect of
disqualifying more Blacks than Whites, 86 yet section 4 forbade the use of facially
neutral tests without inquiry into whether they are being discriminatorily administered
(indeed, even if it can be proved that they are not). In South Carolina's view, since
the tests were not prima facie violations of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress's
blanket prohibition of them-banning innocent as well as invidiously motivated
tests-was not an appropriate exercise of its power to enforce that Amendment.87
More generally, South Carolina argued that the power to enforce the Amendment did
not permit overbreadth-i.e., did not permit Congress's forbidding any practice not
itself a violation of the Amendment.
The Court expressly rejected this narrow view of Congress's power.88 Even if a
test used by South Carolina currently were free of discriminatory purpose, neutral on
its face, and administered fairly-and thus not a violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment-Congress would be free to forbid the use of literacy tests to overcome
the lingering effects ofpast discrimination.89 Whites who were illiterate were already
registered (due to discriminatory administration of the tests in the past), and even-
handed use of tests in the future to determine the eligibility ofpreviously-unregistered
voters would "freeze the effect of past discrimination in favor of unqualified white
registrants."90 True, an alternative would be to require re-registration of everyone
84 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
85 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1994)).
86 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959).
87 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333 (1966).
88 Id. at 327.
89 Id. at 333-34.
90 Id. at 334. This same analysis produced a like result in Gaston County v. United States,
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pursuant to a neutral literacy test, but "Congress permissibly rejected [this]
alternative... believing that this would be too harsh on many whites who had
enjoyed the franchise for their entire adult lives."91
More important than the precise holding in South Carolina v. Katzenbach was
the Court's vision of the general scope of Congress's powers to enforce the Civil War
Amendments. The Court declared:
The language and purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment the prior decisions construing
its several provisions, and the general doctrines of constitutional interpretation, all point
to onefiundamental principle. As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress
may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial
discrimination in voting.92
The Court was emphatic that the Civil War Amendments represented an enlargement
of Congress's powers, relative to both the states and the federal courts:
[T]he Framers indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implenmenting
the rights created in [the Amendment]. "It is the power of Congress which has been
enlarged. Congress is authorized to enforce the provisions by appropriate legislation...."
Accordingly, in addition to the courts, Congress has fIl remedial powers to effectuate
the constitutional prohibition ...93
The Court declared that the test to be applied in determining the scope of
Congress's power under the Civil War Amendments "is the same as in all cases
concerning the express powers of Congress with relation to the reserved powers of
the States."'94 The Court declared that the "classic formulation" of that test, laid down
by Chief Justice Marshall fifty years before the Civil War in McCulloch v.
Maryland,95 applied here as well, and it quoted that formulation: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."96
This principle, the Court explained, was "echoed" in the early decisions
articulating Congress's powers under the Civil Rights Amendments:
395 U.S. 285,297 (1969).
91 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334.
92 Id. at 324 (emphasis added).
93 Id. at 326 (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879)).
941Id.
95 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
96 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819)) (emphasis added).
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Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they
contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment ofperfect equality of civil rights and
the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is
brought within the domain of congressional power.97
Finally, the Court quoted yet another famous Marshall chestnut, this one from
Gibbons v. Ogden,98 and declared it applicable to Congress's powers under the Civil
Rights Amendments: 'This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in
itself; maybe exercised to its utmost extent and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution."99
b. Katzenbach v. Morgan
The Court's second opinion in this quartet Katzenbach v. Morgan, 100 is perhaps
the most interesting, as it represents the broadest application of the principles declared
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach (all of which were reiterated).1' 1 At issue was the
validity of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act 102 which forbade states'
conditioning a person's eligibility to vote in federal, state, and/or local elections upon
the ability to "read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language"
if the person had completed at least the sixth grade in a school in the United States
(including Puerto Rico) "in which the predominant classroom language was other
than English.' 10 3 This provision had been inserted into the bill at the behest of
Representatives and Senators from New York, and its purpose was to enfranchise
those who had migrated from Puerto Rico to New York City.104
Section 4(e) was challenged as exceeding Congress's powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment because (1) an English-language requirement was not itself
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) there was no antecedent
constitutional violation for which enfranchising non-English-speaking Puerto Ricans
97 Id. at 327 (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345-46 (emphasis added)). The Court
noted that this language was employed again fifty years later with respect to conferral of similar
power upon Congress in the Eighteenth Amendment Id. (citing James Everard's Breweries v. Day,
265 U.S. 545,558-59 (1924)).
98 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
99 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)).
100 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
101 Id. at 648-51.
102 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1994).
103 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 643 n.l.
104Id. at 644.
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could be a remedy.105 The Court rejected this argument by proffering two
independent reasons, each sufficient in its own right, why section 4(e)
"is ... appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause." 106
The first reason assumed the correctness of the challengers' contention that there
was no antecedent constitutional violation. Even on that assumption, the Court
concluded that enfranchising Puerto Ricans would increase their leverage within the
political structure, and thereby reduce the prospect that they would suffer
unconstitutional discrimination in the provision of governmental services generally:
[Section] 4(e) may be viewed as a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community
residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by government-both in the
imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or administration ofgovernment
services, such as public schools, public housing and law enforcement.
*- The practical effect of§ 4(e) is to prohibit New York from denying the right to
vote to large segments of its Puerto Rican community. Congress has thus prohibited the
State from denying to that community the right that is preservative of all rights. This
enhanced political power will be helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in
public services for the entire Puerto Rican community. Section 4(e) thereby enables the
Puerto Rican minority better to obtain "perfect equality of civil rights and the equal
protection of the laws. ,107
Katzenbach v. Morgan thus establishes that Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment embraces quite generalized steps, taken without proof of past
discrimination, simply because they are likely to reduce the danger of equal protection
violations in the future.
In addition, the Court was emphatic that it was not the proper role of the judiciary
to second-guess Congress's assessment that such instrumental prophylactic steps are
appropriate. The Court noted:
It was well within congressional authority to say that this need of the Puerto Rican
minority for the vote warranted federal intrusion upon any state interests served by the
English literacy requirement It wasfor Congress, as the branch that made thisjudgment,
to assess and weight the various conflicting considerations-the risk ofpervasiveness
of the discrimination in governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the state
restriction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil, the adequacy or
availability ofalternative remedies, and the nature and significance of the state interests
that would be affected by the nullification of the English literacy requirement.... It is
105 Id. at 648.
106 Id. at 650.
107 Id at 652-53 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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notfor us to review the congressional resolution ofthese factors. It is enough that we are
able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.108
The Court then turned to its second, independent rationale for upholding section
4(e); namely, that Congress might harbor legitimate concem that the English-literacy
requirement was in fact invidiously motivated and thus violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The mere existence of an objective basis for concern sufficed to entitle
Congress to eliminate the possibility by banning the practice:
The result is no different if we confine our inquiry to the question whether § 4(e)
was merely legislation aimed at the elimination of an invidious discrimination in
establishing voter qualifications. We are told that New York's English literacy
requirement originated in the desire to provide an incentive for non-English speaking
immigrants to learn the English language and in order to assure the intelligent exercise
of the franchise. Yet Congress might well have questioned, in light of the many
exemptions provided, and evidence suggesting that prejudice played a prominent role in
the enactment of the requirement, whether these were actually the interests being served.
Congress might have also questioned whether denial of a right deemed so precious and
fundamental in our society was a necessary or appropriate means of encouraging persons
to learn English, or of furthering the goal of an intelligent exercise of the
franchise.... Here again, it is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress
might predicate a judgment that the application of New York's English literacy
requirement ... constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.109
The breadth and significance of the holdings in Katzenbach v. Morgan are
highlighted by the observations of the two dissenting Justices, Harlan and Stewart.1 10
They first concluded that, in applying traditional judicial standards, the New York
English-literacy requirement did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. They
decried the Court's allowance to Congress of a power to invalidate based only on a
rational suspicion that the state law might be invidiously motivated.111 They then
addressed whether Congress might annul section 4(e) despite its constitutionality (the
first rationale used by the Court). In their view, the absence of a "legislative record
supporting" the "hypothesized discrimination" in other areas of public service
precluded the prophylactic rationale the majority had embraced.1 12
108 Id. at 653 (emphasis added).
109 Ia at 654-56 (citation and footnotes omitted). The Court went on to ask whether section
4(e) itself violated any other provision of the Constitution and, after concluding that it did not,
declared section 4(e) an appropriate exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power. Id. at
656-658.
110 Id. at 659-71.
I Id. at 664-66.
1 12 Id. at 666-67. The dissent also characterized the majority opinion as redefining the
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c. Oregon v. Mitchell
In Oregon v. Mitchell,113 the Court unanimously upheld a 1970 amendment to
the Voting Rights Act that extended the ban on literacy tests to the entire country for
five years (the ban had previously been applicable only to seven states).1 14 But by a
5-4 decision, the Court struck down Congress's effort to require states to lower their
voting age to eighteen for state and local elections. 115 There was no majority opinion
for the Court, but the several opinions shed light on the breadth of the power
conferred on Congress to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
The five votes denying Congress the power to lower the voting age in state
elections noted that those individuals 18-20 were not a discrete and insular minority
and Congress had made no findings suggesting they were victims of, or vulnerable
to, constitutional violations.1 16 The several opinions that collectively upheld the
extension of the literacy ban to the entire nation-in the face of Arizona's contention
that there was no justification for concluding that Arizona's literacy test had ever been
used to violate the Constitution-offered illuminating insights on the Justices'
understanding of Congress's power.
Justice Stewart, whose opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun, began by noting that whether or not the problem existed in all states,
Congress had fairly concluded that there were serious problems in at least some
states. 117 Without ever questioning Arizona's claim that there was no problem in
Arizona warranting an exercise of Congress's power, this opinion declared that a
nationwide ban nonetheless was an appropriate exercise of congressional power:
Congress has now undertaken to extend the ban on literacy tests to the whole
Nation. I see no constitutional impediment to its doing so. Nationwide application
substantive content of the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 668-a charge that is not consistent with
the text of the majority opinion, but which "stuck" as an arguing point until rejected by the modem
Court. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
113 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
114 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970)
(codified at42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994)).
1 15 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 118. The Court made two other holdings in Mitchell that are not
relevant to the issues in this paper. First, Congress was within its power in reducing residency
requirements for state and local elections, as state bans violated the right to travel interstate; and
second, Congress appropriately exercised its powers respecting eligibility to vote for federal office
in lowering the voting age to eighteen for federal elections. Id. at 118-24.
1 16 See, e.g., id. at 212-13 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 281
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117 Id. at 280-82 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, CJ.,
& Blackmun, J.).
2001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURVAL[
reduces the danger that federal intervention will be perceived as unreasonable
discrimination against particular States or particular regions of the country. This in turn
increases the likelihood of voluntary compliance with the letter and spirit of federal law.
Nationwide application facilitates the free movement of citizens from one State to
another, since it eliminates the prospect that a change in residence will mean the loss of
a federally protected right Nationwide application avoids the often difficult task of
drawing a line between those States where a problem is pressing enough to warrant
federal intervention and those where it is not Such a line may well appear discriminatory
to those who think themselves on the wrong side of it Moreover the application of the
line to particular States can entail a substantial burden on administrative and judicial
machinery and a diversion of enforcement resources. Finally, nationwide application may
be reasonably thought appropriate when Congress acts against an evil such as racial
discrimination which in varying degrees manifests itself in every part of the country. A
remedy for racial discrimination which applies in all the States underlines an awareness
that the problem is a national one and reflects a national commitment to its solution....
Because the justification for extending the ban on literacy tests to the entire Nation
need not turn on whether literacy tests unfairly discriminate against Negroes in every
State in the Union, Congress was not required to make state-by-state findings .... In the
interests ofuniformity, Congress may paint with a much broader brush than may this
Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and
controversies upon individual records... Experience gained under [an earlier statute]
has now led Congress to conclude that it should go the whole distance. This approach to
the problem is a rational one; consequently it is within the constitutional power of
Congress [under the Civil War Amendments]. 118
Justice Harlan's opinion took much the same stance:
Despite the lack of evidence of specific instances of discriminatory application or
effect Congress could have determined that racial prejudice is prevalent throughout the
Nation, and that literacy tests unduly lend themselves to discriminatory application, either
conscious or unconscious. This danger of violation of [the Civil War Amendments] was
sufficient to authorize the exercise of congressional power [thereunder].
Whether to engage in a more particularized inquiry into the extent and effects of
discrimination, either as a condition precedent or as a condition subsequent to
suspension of literacy tests, was a choice for Congress to make. The fact that the
suspension is only for five years will require Congress to reevaluate at the close of that
period. While a less sweeping approach in this delicate area might well have been
appropriate, the choice which Congress made was within the range of the
reasonable. 119
118 Ia at 283-84 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,joined by Burger, CJ.,
& Blackmun, J.) (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
119 Id at 216-17 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added).
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It is striking to recall that at the time, Justices Stewart and Harlan, the authors of
the two opinions just quoted, were the most conservative Justices on the Court with
respect to Congress's powers under the Civil War Amendments (as they were on
most issues); indeed, they had dissented in Katzenbach v. Morgan.120 Yet they
embraced the view that Congress could nationalize a solution to a problem based on
localized evidence of discrimination and congressional concern that the prejudice that
fueled that discrimination was more widely shared. And even they agreed that the
scope of judicial review of the congressional action was a narrow one: the law must
be upheld if Congress was "rational 121 or "within the range of the reasonable." 122
Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by Justices White and Marshall, also
championed uniformity. Congress was free to ban literacy tests nationwide, even if
Arizona had never discriminated, because such tests would perpetuate the effect of
past racial discrimination in education in other states from whence Arizona citizens
might have come. 123 The Constitution "was framed upon the theory that the peoples
of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity
and salvation are in union and not division." 12 4 This opinion, too, identified the
reviewing lens as whether the Court can "perceive a rational basis for the
congressional judgments."1'25
The remaining two Justices, Black and Douglas, authored opinions relying on
what they believed was evidence that there was unconstitutional behavior in all the
states.126
d. City of Rome v. United States
The last of the initial quartet of decisions defining the scope of Congress's power
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments-and the first issued by a Court that
included any of its present members 127-was City ofRome v. United States.128 The
City of Rome wished to change its election rules in a variety of respects, including,
120 384 U.S. 641,659 (1966).
12 1 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 284 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122 Id at 217 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12 3 Id. at 235-36 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by White &
Marshall, H3.).
124 Id at 233 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by White &
Marshall, JJ.) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,523 (1935)).
125 Id. at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by White &
Marshall, JJ.).
126 See id. at 117 (opinion written by Black, J.); id. at 135 (opinion written by Douglas, J.).
127 Justices Stevens and Rehnquist had joined the Court in the years since Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
128 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
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inter alia, going from regional to "at large" election of all city council members and
annexing new neighborhoods into the city (and hence its electorate). What stood in
the city's way was the obligation, under the Voting Rights Act, to secure "clearance"
from the Attorney General. 129 The Attorney General refused to clear the proposed
changes because, albeit free of discriminatory purpose, they would have a
"discriminatory impact," i.e., the changes might weaken the chances of Blacks being
elected to city office. The city contended that the federal government was without
power to ban innocently motivated election changes simply because of their effect 130
The Court rejected the challenge by a 6-3 vote. The Court observed that it had
already held that Congress could ban practices not themselves unconstitutional, if
they were appropriate to remedy or prevent denials of equal protection.131 In the area
of voting rights, the Southern states had shown themselves ready to use "unremitting
and ingenious" devices to continue the exclusion of Black voters.132 Congress could
"rationally" conclude that barring practices with discriminatory impact would prevent
practices that were infected with a discriminatory purpose eluding detection:
In the present case, we hold that the Act's ban on electoral changes that are
discriminatory in effect is an appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the
Fifteenth Amendment, even if it is assumed that § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only
intentional discrimination in voting. Congress could rationally have concluded that,
because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional
racial discrimination in voting create the risk ofpurposeful discrimination, it was proper
to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact We find no reason, then, to disturb
Congress' considered judgment that banning electoral changes that have a discriminatory
impact is an effective method of preventing States from "'undo[ing] or defeat[ing] the
rights recently won' by Negroes."133
Justice Stevens joined this opinion, but Justice Rehnquist dissented. That dissent
is important as he is now part of the prevailing majority on the Court. Justice
Rehnquist began by noting the lower court finding, ignored in the Court's opinion,
that "Rome has not employed any discriminatory barriers to black voter registration
in the past 17 years"; indeed, the city had in recent years been supportive of Blacks'
129 Georgia and all its cities were subject to the preclearance requirements of section 4 of the
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994).
130 The Court had ruled in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), that practices which
are innocently motivated do not violate the Equal Protection Clause, even though they have
disparate effects.
131 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S 301 (1966).
132 City ofRome, 446 U.S. at 174 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309).
133 Id. at 177-78 (quoting Beer v. Unites States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 91-397, at 8 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3277)) (footnote and citations
omitted).
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efforts to run for elective posts. 134 Additionally, the city had proved, to the District
Court's satisfaction, that the proposed changes were not discriminatorily
motivated.135 He thus described the Court's holding as follows:
The Court holds today that the city of Rome can constitutionally be compelled to
seek congressional approval for most of its governmental changes even though it has not
engaged in any discrimination against blacks for at least 17 years. Moreover, the Court
also holds that federal approval can be constitutionally denied even after the city has
proved that the changes are not purposefully discriminatory. 136
Justice Rehnquist recognized that Congress has power to go beyond what the
judiciary can do to enforce the Civil War Amendments: "It has never been seriously
maintained... that Congress can do no more than the judiciary to enforce the
Amendments' commands.' 137 "Congress can act remedially to enforce the judicially
established substantive prohibitions of the Amendments." 138 However, Congress
cannot redefine the substantive sweep of the Amendment.139
While the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments prohibit only purposeful discrimination,
the decisions of this Court have recognized that in some circumstances, congressional
prohibition of state or local action which is not purposefully discriminatory may
nevertheless be appropriate remedial legislation under the Civil War Amendments.
Those circumstances, however, are not without judicial limits. [The Court's]
decisions indicate that congressional prohibition of some conduct which may not itself
violate the Constitution is "appropriate" legislation "to enforce" the Civil War
Amendments if that prohibition is necessary to remedy prior constitutional violations by
the governmental unit, or if necessary to effectively prevent purposeful discrimination
by a governmental unit140
The injection of "necessity" as a prerequisite to congressional prohibition of
otherwise constitutionally permissible conduct marked the distinction between Justice
Rehnquist's view and the view adopted by the Court He agreed that Congress could
shift the burden of proof to the states to prove absence of bad purpose, but disagreed
that Congress could deny the state the right to act once it had bome that burden:
134 Id. at 208 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 209 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13 6 Id.
137 Id at 210 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13 8 Id.
139 Id. at 210-11.
140 Id. at 213 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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[G]iven the difficulties of proving that an electoral change or annexation has been
undertaken for the purpose of discriminating against blacks, Congress could properly
conclude that as a remedial matter it was necessary to place the burden of proving lack
of discriminatory purpose on the localities. But all of this does not support the conclusion
that Congress is acting remedially when it continues the presumption of purposeful
discrimination even after the locality has disproved that presumption.141
Justice Rehnquist conceded that in South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Oregon v.
Mitchell the Court had upheld flat prohibitions on facially neutral conduct (literacy
tests) without affording the states an opportunity to prove their innocent motivation.
But those cases involved special circumstances: a demonstration of such latent
contemporary mischief as to make a flat ban the "only" effective way to "prevent the
occurrence of purposeful discrimination." 142 No such urgency attended this case, in
which the city's reformed ways were evident The upshot Justice Rehnquist
concluded, is that what the Court was really doing (without admitting it) was to allow
Congress power to redefine the substantive content of the Civil War Amendments so
as to ban discriminatory effect as well as discriminatory purpose. And, he insisted, the
judiciary having interpreted those amendments differently, Congress was without
power to disagree. 143
e. Lessons of the "First Quartet"
A fair reading of these cases, en toto, yields the following principles:
1. Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment allows it to ban
conduct that is not itself violative of that Amendment if the "overbreadth" is
"appropriate" to assure citizens the fall protection of that Amendment.
2. One "appropriate" purpose for overbreadth is to prevent invidiously-motivated
state actions that might go unchecked because the bad motive will escape detection.
(Three of the Court's decisions approve this principle, 144 by upholding statutes that
ban practices altogether without inquiry into the purpose animating the practices.
These statutes ban the practices in order to ensure that they are not engaged in with
undetectable discriminatory purpose.)
3. Another "appropriate" purpose, articulated in Katzenbach v. Morgan, is more
broadly instrumental: to alter the legal landscape in a manner that reduces the chances
that states will engage in invidiously-motivated behavior. 145
141 Id. at 214 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
142 Id. at 215-16 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 219-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
144See City of Rome, 446 U.S. 156; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
145 384 U.S. 641 (1966). The "appropriate" purpose in this case was ensuring that minorities
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4. In reviewing Congress's determination that a prohibition is "appropriate," the
Court will apply rational-basis review, deferring to Congress's assessment unless it
is irrational.
2. Quartet #2. The Modern Cases: Is There Retreat?
After City of Rome v. United States, the Court went seventeen years without
again addressing the scope of Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment During that period, the composition of the Court changed
radically. When City ofBoerne v. Flores was decided in 1997,146 only two Justices
remained from the Court that had decided City of Rome. Among others, Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White were gone. Justices Scalia, Thomas,
O'Connor, and Kennedy-Justices whose views coincide more often with those of
Justice Rehnquist, who had been the lone dissenter in City ofRome-had joined the
Court.
This newly composed Court has, in the past three years, issued its own quartet
of decisions addressing the scope of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power. The
common wisdom is that these decisions signal a retreat from the broad vision of
Congress's power reflected in the earlier quartet. 147 Is that true? Or is it simply that
the laws examined in the second quartet were less appropriate implementers of the
Fourteenth Amendment than those in the first quartet? Recall that one congressional
statute was struck down even in the early era: Congress's effort to lower the voting
age in state and local elections from twenty-one to eighteen. It was struck down
because Congress had no reason to think that eighteen to twenty-year-olds were a
group suffering (or threatened with suffering) discrimination violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment So, it was always a staple of the Court's conception of the
Fourteenth Amendment that Congress could not resort to overbreadth--to banning
conduct that might be constitutional-unless there was reason to fear that absent that
step a real risk of unconstitutional behavior existed.
Recall also that all four decisions in the first quartet involved a single subject
area, voting rights, as to which discrimination against Blacks had been virulent for
centuries and surely remained prevalent in at least some parts of the country when the
statute was enacted. The Court's willingness to uphold powerfil congressional action
to confront a pinpointed problem of egregious dimension does not necessarily mean
had a sufficient voice in the political process to protect themselves. Id. at 653-55.
146 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
147 See, e.g., Joanne C. Brant, Seminole Tribe, Flores and State Employees: Reflections on
a New Relationship, 2 EMPLoYMENT RTs. & EMPLOYMENT PoL'Y J. 175, 199 (1998); Jesse H.
Choper, On the Difference in Importance between Supreme Court Doctrine and Actual
Consequences: A Review of the Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term, 19 CARDozO L. REv. 2259,
2292 (1998); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REv. 857, 917 (1999).
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that that Court would have been equally comfortable with across-the-board statutes
regulating states from stem to stem, as Title ]I of the ADA does.148
Surely, the language of the early quartet is broad enough to suggest that the
Court of that era would have upheld the statutes that the Court has confronted in the
past three years. But, the Court's commitment to the breadth of that language was
never put to the test.
The current Court has not suggested any doubt about the validity of any of the
decisions in the original quartet and indeed has reiterated virtually all of the general
principles announced in those earlier cases. Its explanation for striking down the
statutes in recent cases has been, invariably, to the effect that "this statute is different"
Yet, though the Court has been careful to insist that it is not overruling those earlier
cases, it is surely doubtful that the Court as presently constituted would have upheld
the statutes in Katzenbach v. Morgan or City of Rome (from which, recall, Justice
Rehnquist dissented). One may wonder whether the Court is paying lip service to the
earlier opinions while, as a practical matter, relegating them to the junk pile. 49
The decision in Garrett likely will reveal the Court's true hand, for, as will be
shown in Part LE, the case for Fourteenth Amendment grounding of the ADA is
stronger than was true of the RFRA, the Patent Remedy Act (PRA), the ADEA, and
the VAWA. To gauge that, it is necessary first to examine the quartet of decisions that
found these statutes wanting.
a. City of Boeme v. Flores
The new era was launched with the Court's decision in City of Boerne v.
Flores.150 The question was whether the RFRA 151 was an appropriate exercise of
Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power. The Court held that it was not
The RFRA had been enacted by Congress in response to the Court's holding, in
Employment Division v. Smith,152 that the "free exercise of religion" clause of the
First Amendment, incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require
states to make exceptions to laws of general applicability to facilitate religious
practice.153 The Oregon law at issue in Smith made ingestion of narcotics a crime and
148 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994).
149 Te four Justices in the current minority have accused the majority of doing precisely that
in the Court's recent rulings assaying Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. United
States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1766 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens,
Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ) (to be published at 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
150 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
151 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).
152 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
153 Id. at 884-85.
[Vol. 62:31
DISABILI7Y& FEDERALISM
recognized no exception for smoking peyote as a religious practice.154 The plaintiff
in Smith argued that the state was obliged to permit his religious practice unless it
conflicted with a compelling state interest 155 He relied on prior interpretations of the
Free Exercise Clause that appeared to support his position. 156 But a bare majority of
the Court in Smith ran roughshod over those precedents, announcing a broad new
principle that states may enforce neutral laws without making an exception for
religious observance, so long as the laws were not enacted for the purpose of
forbidding religious practice. 157
Congress reacted promptly by enacting the RFRA, which attempted to
reestablish the rule of the prior Supreme Court cases by prohibiting all governments
from "substantially burdening" a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government can demonstrate
that the burden "(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2)
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest" 158
Its power under the Fourteenth Amendment was Congress's only predicate for
enacting this law.
The Court saw the statute as a congressional attempt to impose Congress's view
of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in preference to the Court's view. That
was an abuse of Congress's power. The Court is the ultimate interpreter of the
Fourteenth Amendment Once the Court says what the Fourteenth Amendment
means, Congress has no power emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment to
superimpose a contrary view.159
With this established, the Court turned to a consideration of whether the RFRA
could be justified as preventing or remedying violations of the Free Exercise Clause
as the Court had construed it in Smith. The RFRA's defenders, invoking the decisions
of the first quartet, argued that the RFRA was an appropriate mechanism to
"prevent[ ] and remed[y] laws which are enacted with the unconstitutional object of
targeting religious beliefs and practices."'160 The City ofBoerne Court acknowledged
that "Congress can prohibit laws with discriminatory effects in order to
prevent... discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause," 161 but it
154 Op. REv. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987).
155 Smith, 521 U.S. at 882.
156 See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas
v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
157 Smith, 521 U.S. at 882.
158 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
159 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,519-29 (1997).
160 Id. at 529 (citation omitted).
161 Id.
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announced and applied two limits on the use of that prophylactic. The first is the
requirement of a serious constitutional problem in need of redress:
While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be
a congruence between the means used and the ends achieved. The appropriateness of
remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures
appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.
... Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be appropriate when
there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the congressional enactment
have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional. 162
The RFRA foundered at this first step because the "RFRA's legislative record
lacks examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of
religious bigotry. The history of persecution in this country detailed in the hearings
mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years." 163 Indeed, the legislative record
reflected Congress's awareness that deliberate governmental persecution of religion
was virtually nonexistent.164 While the existence of a sufficient predicate for
prophylactic legislation does not depend solely "on the state of the legislative record
Congress compiles,"' 65 there was no evidence outside that record to the contrary, and
"Congress' concern" in enacting the RFRA "was with the incidental burdens
imposed, not the object or purpose of the legislation."'' 66
The Court then unveiled the second limit on Congress's resort to prophylactic
legislation: that it be proportional and congruent with the constitutional problem.167
Against a backdrop of little, if any, unconstitutional behavior, the RFRA invalidates
all neutral laws and official actions that have a disparate impact reaches every comer
of governmental action, and does so indefinitely as the RFRA has no termination date
or termination mechanism. 168 In these respects, the RFRA goes far beyond the one-
issue pinpointed statutes that were upheld in the first quartet. 169
While demolishing the RFRA, the Court repeatedly emphasized the wide latitude
Congress enjoys in determining the need for and shape of legislation enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment and also the concomitant broad deference the Court owes
Congress in assessing whether the exercise of that power is within constitutional
162 Id. at 530, 532 (citations omitted).
163 Id. at 530.
164 Id. at 530-31.
165 Id. at 531.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 533.
168 Id. at 532.
169 See id. at 532-33.
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bounds. 170 The innocent reader might have concluded that the result in City of
Boerne was an isolated occurrence driven by the Court's perception that Congress's
real goal was to rewrite the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than
enforce the less ambitious version recognized by the Court in Smith. But stay tuned!
Significantly, no Justice argued that the RFRA was a proper exercise of
Congress's Section 5 power if Smith correctly defined the reach of the Free Exercise
Clause. The three dissenters wished, rather, to re-examine the correctness of Smith,
for if the proper construction of the Constitution is as declared in the pre-Smith
decisions, then the RFRA was prohibiting only that which the Fourteenth
Amendment already prohibits. 17 1
b. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank, 172 the Court addressed the constitutionality of the provision in the Patent
Remedy Act 173 authorizing patent holders to sue states that infringe patents. 174
Congress declared that it was exercising its powers under the Patent Clause,175 the
Commerce Clause, 176 and the Fourteenth Amendment The majority in this 5-4
decision applied Seminole Tribe in holding that the Patent and Commerce Clause
predicates for the Act were insufficient to lift the state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity.177 Inquiry focused, thus, on whether the Act was a proper exercise of
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
The patent holders and the Solicitor General argued that the Patent Remedy Act
was aimed at securing the Fourteenth Amendment's protections against deprivations
ofproperty without due process of law.178 The Court expressed some doubt whether
patent infringement by states would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 79 but that
was not its basis for holding that the Act was not an appropriate exercise of
170 Id. at 517-18, 519-20, 536.
171 Id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 566 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
172 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (to be published at 527 U.S. 627 (1999)).
173 Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271,296
(1994).
174 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994).
175 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
176 Id. at cl. 3.
177 Coll. Say. Bank 119 S. Ct. at 2202.
178 Id. at 2208.
179 Id. at 2207.
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Congress's Section 5 power. Rather, the Court relied on the paucity of evidence that
there was a serious constitutional problem needing correction.
"Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States .... "180 The
Court noted that there had been only eight patent infringement suits prosecuted
against states in the 110 years between 1880 and 1990. The Patent Remedy Act thus
foundered at the first hurdle erected in City of Boerne: there was no constitutional
problem that needed fixing.
The four dissenters reiterated their stance that the Eleventh Amendment does not
preclude Congress's authorization of private suits to enforce legislation adopted
pursuant to Congress's Article I powers. 181 They also disagreed with the majority's
assessment of whether Congress had identified a constitutional problem sufficient to
exercise its Section 5 power.18 2
c. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents
The Court's decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,183 another 5-4
decision, is the most pertinent to the fate of the ADA, as it too involved a statute
forbidding employment discrimination, the ADEA.184 The Court's opinion, this time
authored by Justice O'Connor, contains expansive statements of the scope of
Congress's Section 5 power:
Congress' § 5 power is not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots
the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment Rather, Congress' power "to enforce"
the Amendment includes authority both to remedy and to deter violations of rights
guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including
that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text
... Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies, and we have
never held that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting reasonably prophylactic
legislation.185
But in the end, these prove to have been just a tease. For despite the overwhelming
documentation in the legislative history of the ADEA of the disadvantages
180 Id.
181 Id. at 2219 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, Ginsberg, & Breyer, JJ).
182 I. at 2213-17.
183 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (to be published at 528 U.S. 62 (2000)).
184 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998).
185 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644, 648.
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encountered by older persons in the workplace, the Court ruled that the ADEA
flunked both parts of the two-part test decreed in City ofBoerne.
Because classifications based on age are subject only to rational-basis review,
"[s]tates may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth
Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest." 186 Because "increasing age brings with it increasing susceptibility to
physical difficulties," 187 it is rational for employers to prefer younger workers;
granted, not all older workers will have increased physical difficulties, but employers
have an economic interest in avoiding the "search costs" that would be entailed in
making individualized assessments. 188
It follows that the use of age would violate the Fourteenth Amendment only if
motivated by invidious prejudice. But "[o]lder persons... unlike those who suffer
discrimination on the basis ofrace or gender, have not been subjected to a 'history of
purposeful unequal treatment' and the reason why is obvious: everyone hopes to
join the club.189
This assessment was confirmed by the ADEA's legislative record. "Congress
never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the states, much less any
discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation."190
Isolated snippets in the legislative materials would be insufficient in any event to
establish that unconstitutional age discrimination had become "a problem of national
import;" but in truth the only evidence in the record was of rational use of age in
filling law enforcement and fire-fighting occupations-a use that does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment 191 Most significantly, Congress made no findings that states
were committing unconstitutional age discrimination. 92
With the conclusion that there was no constitutional problem respecting age, it
followed inevitably that the second hurdle-that the legislation be congruent and
proportional to the problem-could not be surmounted. The ADEA bans a wide
swath of conduct without requiring proof that it is invidiously motivated. Without
reason to think that there might be improper motivation underlying that conduct, there
is no justification for banning lawful conduct as a prophylactic against nonexistent
186Id. at 646.
187 I. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979)).
188 Id. at 645-46. On the basis of this insight, the Court prior to Kimel had upheld state-
imposed maximum age limits for state judges, foreign service officers, and police officers. See
generally Gregory v. Ashcrof, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Mass.
Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
189 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645 (quotingMurgia, 427 U.S. at 313 (quoting San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973))).
190 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 649.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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unconstitutional behavior. "The appropriateness of remedial measures must be
considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one
harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one." 193
The four dissenters in Kimel relied solely on their disagreement about the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.194 The ADEA was concededly an appropriate
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power,' 95 which is sufficient to empower
Congress to authorize private suits for its enforcement 1 96 Curiously, the dissenters
made no reference to the alternative Fourteenth Amendment grounding for the
ADEA. Does this signify doubt on their part that the ADEA could pass muster under
the Fourteenth Amendment or simply a desire to emphasize the degree of their
hostility to Seminole Tribe by championing the Article I provenance for the provision
struck down in Kimel?197
d. United States v. Morrison
In its most recent decision respecting Congress's Section 5 power, United States
v. Morrison,198 the Court struck down, again by a 5-4 vote, the provision in the
Violence Against Women Act conferring a federal cause of action enabling victims
of gender violence to sue the perpetrators for damages.199 Congress invoked two
sources of power for the enactment: its Commerce Clause power, and its Section 5
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
The Court rejected Congress's reliance on the Commerce Clause, applying the
Court's new calculus for determining the scope of that power, first announced in
United States v. Lopez: that the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress's
regulation of noncommercial activity not tied to the crossing of state lines simply
because the aggregate of all incidents of that noncommercial conduct have an effect
on interstate commerce.2°0 This is, of course, another piece of the Court's present
mission to contract the power of the federal government vis-a-vis the states, but as it
193 Id. at 648 (quoting City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,530 (1997)).
194 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
195 The opinion for the Court acknowledged its prior holding that the ADEA is a valid
exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 635 (citing EEOC
v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,243 (1983)).
196 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 652 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197 The only elliptical reference to the Fourteenth Amendment is the inclusion, as one of the
reasons for the wrongness of Seminole Tribe, that it "unnecessarily forces the Court to resolve
vexing questions of constitutional law respecting Congress' § 5 authority." Id. at 653.
198 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
199 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
200 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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is beyond the scope of this paper, this part of the Morrison opinion will not be further
described.
Removing the Commerce Clause prop meant that the fate of the civil suit in the
VAWA now turned on the Court's ruling respecting the Fourteenth Amendment.
Here, for the first time in the second quartet, the Court acknowledged that Congress
had identified a serious problem of unconstitutional state behavior:
Petitioners' § 5 argument is founded on an assertion that there is pervasive bias in
various state justice systems against victims ofgender-motivated violence. This assertion
is supported by a voluminous congressional record. Specifically, Congress received
evidence that many participants in state justice systems are perpetuating an array of
erroneous stereotypes and assumptions. Congress concluded that these discriminatory
stereotypes often result in insufficient investigation and prosecution of gender-motivated
crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior and credibility of the victims of that crime,
and unacceptably lenient punishments for those who are actually convicted of gender-
motivated violence. 201
But the VAWA foundered at the second hurdle: the Court ruled that it is not a
congruent or proportional response to the constitutional problem Congress identified.
The problem is discrimination by state actors in processing claims of gender violence.
But the solution is not addressed to the state. Instead, it is aimed at the perpetrator of
the violence, who is not a state actor and could not have violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.202
This seems an extremely weak justification for invalidating the VAWA. But it
is beyond the scope of this paper, for the challenged provision of the ADA, unlike
that in the VAWA, is addressed to the state and thus escapes the rationale that led to
invalidation in Morrison.
The decision in Morrison drew a dissent from the four expected Justices. All
would have upheld the challenged provision as a proper exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause power, these Justices reject the incursions on that power that
Lopez and Morrison have created.203 Two of the four also "doubt[ed] the Court's
reasoning" that Fourteenth Amendment legislation cannot be aimed at private parties
who have profited from the state's discrimination.204
201 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1755 (emphasis added).
202 Id. at 1758.
203 See id at 1764-74 (Souter, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 1778 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).
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III. ASSESSING GARRETT AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE ADA
In the ADA, Congress declared that it was exercising its powers under both the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. There can be little
doubt that the employment provisions of the ADA are an appropriate exercise of
Congress's Commerce Clause power. The Court has repeatedly held that state
employment sufficiently impacts upon interstate commerce to justify Congress's
regulation of employment terms, and indeed, the Court expressly stated in Kimel-
which postdated Lopez-that the ADEA is an appropriate exercise of Congress's
Commerce Clause power.205 There is no reason to think that the Court's decision in
Morrison, issued just five months after Kimel, marks any retreat in that respect
Morrison professed not to be expanding upon Lopez, and it was rationalized entirely
on the noneconomic character of violence against women. State employment is
economic activity.20 6 Therefore, under the Lopez-Morrison test; so long as the subject
of regulation is commercial and affects interstate commerce in the aggregate, its
intrastate character does not put it outside the reach of Congress's Commerce
power.207
The fact that Congress properly exercised its Commerce Clause power in
enacting the ADA will not vindicate the ADA's authorization of private lawsuits
against states. Seminole Tribe holds that the Eleventh Amendment trumps the
Commerce Clause on this dimension.208 Only if the ADA is also a proper exercise
of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment will the authorization of
private suits against states be constitutional; on this dimension, the Fourteenth
Amendment trumps the Eleventh.
205 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 643 (2000) (to be published at 528 U.S. 62
(2000)).
206 The sale of labor, no less than the sale of products, is commerce.
207The statutes in Lopez and Morrison fell because they attempted to regulate
noncommercial practices that do not cross state lines: carrying guns in school zones and gender
violence, respectively. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995); Morrison, 120 S. Ct.
1740 (to be published at 529 U.S. 598 (2000)). Under the holdings in those cases, the Commerce
Clause does not reach intrastate noncommercial activity simply because, in the aggregate, it affects
interstate commerce. There likely will be debates whether all of the applications of Title II of the
ADA apart from employment are properly grounded in the Commerce Clause as commerce has
been redefined in Lopez-Morrison. Some state activities are surely commercial in character. See,
e.g., Erickson v. Bd. of Govemors of State Coils. & Univs. for N.E. l. Univ., 207 F.3d 945 (7th
Cir. 2000) (holding that universities are commercial in character). But as to others, the commercial
character is debatable. See, e.g., Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (discussing
whether Title II of the ADA prohibits disability discrimination in access to rehabilitation programs
ithin prison).
208 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,72-73 (1996).
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A. When Does Disability Discrimination Violate the Fourteenth
Amendment?
To assess whether there was a serious constitutional problem at the time the
ADA was enacted, we need to know what conduct toward persons with disabilities
would violate the constitution. The relevant provision is the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court has issued one decision in which disability discrimination was found to be
a denial of equal protection: City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.209
In Cleburne, the Court refused to apply heightened scrutiny to distinctions based
on mental retardation, because (1) unlike race, distinctions between persons with and
without mental retardation often will be legitimate (and not automatically "suspect")
and (2) given the apparent societal interest in accommodating mental retardation,
heightened scrutiny might render constitutionally suspect (as reverse discrimination)
steps taken to afford equal opportunity to persons with mental retardation.21°
Significantly, the Court did not suggest that other criteria that have triggered
heightened scrutiny for classifications based on race-the discrete and insular
character of a group, the history of past discrimination against its members, and their
political powerlessness--were inapplicable to persons with mental retardation. On the
contrary, in Cleburne and elsewhere, the Court recognized the history of mistreatment
of persons with mental retardation.211 The Cleburne Court likely would have refused
to apply heightened scrutiny to other forms of disability as well; indeed, it hinted as
much in a passage suggesting that the adoption of heightened scrutiny for mental
retardation would embark the Court on a slippery slope that would logically result in
a similar status for age and physical disability.212
Because it rejected heightened scrutiny, the Cleburne Court stated that it would
evaluate the zoning ordinance's constitutionality by asking whether it had a "rational
basis."213 The Court held that the ordinance was not rational, as the city's proffered
reasons for excluding group homes for the mentally retarded could not be squared
with its permission for fraternity houses and student dormitories that posed the same
problems.214 The Court concluded that antipathy for, or fear of, persons with mental
retardation, and not the neutral reasons proffered by the city, explained the differential
treatment.2 15
209 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a zoning ordinance that forbade group
homes for persons with mental retardation, but allowed fratemity houses and student dormitories).
2 10 See id at 442-47.
211 Id. at 446 ("IT]here have been and there will continue to be instances of discrimination
against the retarded that are in fact invidious.").
212Id. at 445-46.
2 13 Id. at 448.
2 14 1d. at 450.
215 Id.
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If we assume the Court will apply "rational basis" scnutiny to all disabilities, the
Equal Protection Clause would be violated if a state engaged in either of two kinds
of conduct toward persons with disabilities: (1) conduct disfavoring persons with
disabilities that is motivated by "mere negative attitudes" about such persons, or by
"vague, undifferentiated fears," 216 and (2) conduct treating such persons differently
from otherwise similarly situated groups when the differentiation is irrational and/or
arbitrary.2
17
The first of these categories means that conduct that would be "rational" if
motivated by a legitimate reason might nonetheless violate the Equal Protection
Clause if the conduct is undertaken not for that reason but out of personal antipathy.
For example, it might not violate the Constitution for a state to refuse to hire a
wheelchair-bound person because it did not want to spend the $200 that would be
needed to build a ramp, but it would be a violation to refuse that hire if it was not the
$200, but rather discomfort with having to associate with a disabled person, that
motivated the decision not to hire. Proffered explanations that are rational will not
save state action if those explanations are mere pretexts for decisions made for
impermissible reasons of animus.
B. The Argument against the ADA as Fourteenth Amendment Legislation
Perhaps the most important court of appeals decision holding that the ADA is not
a proper enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment-given the prominence of and
widespread respect for its author-is Judge Frank Easterbrook's decision for the
Seventh Circuit in Erickson v. Board of Governors.218 The Erickson decision
declared that the invalidity of the ADA follows afortiori from the Supreme Court's
2 16 Id. at 448-49; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (stating that laws must
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose and that the Colorado
Constitutional Amendment providing that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular
protections from the law was not directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete
objective).
2 17 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 630 (stating that constitutionality hinged on whether the
classification was arbitrary); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83 (1988)
("[A]rbitrary and irrational discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause under even our
most deferential standard of review."); City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 46 (1985); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 79 (1972) (holding that an Oregon statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause because its discrimination against a certain class was
"arbitrary and irrational"). Even conduct that disqualifies a single individual is unconstitutional if
arbitrary. Village ofWillowbrookv. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
218 207 F.3d 945 (2000). The court's holding addressed only Title I of the ADA-the
employment title.
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decisions invalidating the RFRA and the ADEA, as it is even harder to fit the ADA
into the Supreme Court's two-part test.219
The Erick on court thought that the ADA "prohibits very little conduct likely to
be held unconstitutional." 220 The ADA's primary aim is to compel employers to
accommodate the distinct needs ofpersons with disability--needs that exist precisely
because such persons are different in ways that disable their ability to perform equally
with others. Therefore, "[t]he ADA's main target is an employer's rational
consideration of disabilities. Rational discrimination by definition does not violate a
constitutional provision that condemns only irrational distinctions based on
disabilities."221
The Erickson court went on: if reliance on a rational distinction is to be
invalidated, there must be proof that it was not the real reason for the decision, but
merely a pretext for a choice that was invidiously motivated. But the ADA does not
require such proof2 22 Additionally, as Congress "did not find that states have adopted
clever devices that conceal irrational discrimination,"223 and the congressional record
discloses no evidence of invidiously-motivated conduct by states, there was no
justification for banning neutral practices as a "prophylactic" against concealed
invidious motivation.224
This line of reasoning also constitutes the backbone of the argument in the brief
for the state agencies in Garrett.225 But their brief embellishes the argument with two
additional points. First the proliferation of state laws banning disability
discrimination by the state itself strengthens the case against the ADA: it reflects that
states are not invidiously motivated (if they were, they would not pass these laws),
and it means that there was no need for Congress to apply the ADA to the states (for
adequate remedies were already available under state law).226 Second, Congress did
not impose the same burdens on the federal government as it placed on the states.227
2 19 Ia- at 949, 951.
220 Ma at 949 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 648 (2000) (to be
published at 528 U.S. 62 (2000))).
221 Id. (first emphasis added).
222 See id at 950.
223 Id. at951.
224 Id at 952. Judge Diane Woods, dissenting, would have upheld the ADA's Fourteenth
Amendment pedigree, concluding that Congress did have evidence of a history of purposefhl
discrimination that justified the adoption of prophylactic measures. Id. at 957-58.
225 See Brief for Petitioners, Univ. ofAla. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett (U.S. argued Oct 11, 2000)
(No. 99-1240).
226 Erickson, 207 F.3d at 33.
227 Id at 40. It is literally true that the ADA does not apply to the federal government. But
the federal government was already under more sweeping constraints (including an obligation to
take affirmative action) by virtue of section 501(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
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The adequacy of state laws as remedies and Congress's failure to apply the same
rles to the federal government have no logical relevance to the Fourteenth
Amendment provenance of a federal statute-the federal government is not targeted
by the Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress's power to enforce that amendment
surely is not subordinate to state law. But the choice by the state agencies' lawyers to
invoke these factors suggests--perhaps accurately-that they think these
considerations may "push the buttons" of Justices who regard the states as
"sovereigns" whose dignity should be respected by Congress.228
C. The Strategic Choices Confronting Those Defending the ADA
Before turning to the affirmative case for the Fourteenth Amendment grounding
of the ADA, advanced in the briefs of the respondents and the United States, it is
useful to describe two strategic choices that had to be made by these parties in
shaping their briefs.
1. How Much of the ADA Is before the Court in University of Alabama
Board of Trustees v. Garrett?
What, exactly, is at issue before the Court in Garrett? Is it the Fourteenth
Amendment grounding of the entire ADA or only of the employment provisions of
the ADA? The ADA has a typical severability clause declaring that the
unconstitutionality of one provision "shall not affect the enforceability of the
remaining provisions of the chapter."2 29 Plaintiffs in these cases alleged only
employment discrimination, but Title I of the ADA encompasses far more than
employment From a traditional "standing" perspective, as the plaintiffs have no
litigation stake in the validity of the provisions of the ADA unrelated to employment,
it would seem that this case properly presents the question of the constitutionality of
§ 791(b) (1994), and implementing regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.701-709 (1991). Furthermore,
shortly after the passage of the ADA, Congress amended section 501 to declare expressly that the
nondiscrimination obligations of the federal government included compliance with all the
employment provisions of the ADA, in addition to the already-existing affirmative action
obligations. See 29 U.S.C. § 791(g) (1994). The only real difference between the federal
government and the states is at the remedy stage. Damages against the federal government, as
against the states under Title I of the ADA, are subject to the monetary cap specified in the Civil
Rights Amendments Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). But states are also subject to suit
under Title II of the ADA where damages are not capped (albeit they cannot be awarded at all
unless the plaintiff proves intentional discrimination).
228 Of course, the claim that the existence of state laws proves that there is no remaining
hostility to persons with disabilities is relevant to the Fourteenth Amendment but as shown, infra
notes 296-305 and accompanying text, the claim is incorrect.
229 42 U.S.C. § 12213 (1994).
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the ADA only as it relates to employment, i.e., all of Title I but only so much of Title
II as applies to employment
But the "question presented," as framed by the petitioners (the state agencies) is,
"[d]o Title I and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 et seq., exceed Congress's enforcement authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment?" 230 What is more, when the case was pending on petition
for certiorari, the parties (petitioners, respondents, and the United States) all joined
a stipulation advising the Court that this case was the best vehicle (of the cases then
pending on petitions for certiorari) for addressing the issues because this case
involved both Titles I and II and thus afforded the Court an opportunity to address the
Fourteenth Amendment grounding of both.231
The brief for the petitioners (the state agencies) challenges Titles I and II in their
entirety, as do the handful of amici curiae briefs supporting the petitioners. 232 Indeed,
much of the attention of these briefs is focused on provisions of the ADA wholly
unrelated to employment
The principal responsive briefs-those of the respondents and of the United
States--took opposite tactics in defining the scope of the litigation. Respondents
advised the Court that they were defending only the employment provisions of the
ADA, as only those are logically at issue here, given the ADA's severability clause
and the plaintiffs' invocation of only the employment provisions. They took this
position not because they thought the rest of Title HI indefensible-indeed, they
assured the Court that they are defensible-but for two practical reasons.
First, the Fourteenth Amendment justifications for many of the provisions
unrelated to employment-deinstitutionalization, removal of architectural barriers,
ends to discrimination in prisons, etc.-are different from the justifications for the
employment provisions. As an example, the Fourteenth Amendment justification for
the ADA provision construed in Olmstead v. L. C.233-- the requirement that mental
health services be provided in the most integrated setting consistent with the patient's
needs--consists mainly of the need to avoid perpetuating past discrimination. States
overbuilt mental institutions during the early part of the twentieth century, when there
was a deliberate goal of segregating persons with mental disabilities from the rest of
230 Brief for Petitioners at i, Garrett (No. 99-1240).
231 Stipulation, Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett (U.S. argued Oct. 11, 2000) (No. 99-
1240).
232 An amicus brief supporting petitioners (the state agencies) was filed by seven states. See
supra note 18. Also, amicus briefs supporting the petitioners were filed by the Coalition for Local
Sovereignty, the Pacific Legal Foundation, and the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation. There were
sixteen amicus briefs supporting respondents. In addition to those of President Bush and the
congressional sponsors of the ADA, briefs supporting respondents were filed by the American Bar
Association, law professors, historians, and a number of disability rights organizations.
233 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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society. Even ifthat segregative goal is no longer animating state decisionmakng 2 34
the existence of these massive institutions has led to communities heavily dependent
on the jobs and patronage that flow from their continued operation. Political
resistance to downsizing these institutions, if motivated by these economic
considerations, would not be invidious, but it would be a perpetuated effect of the
invidiously-motivated decision to create these oversized institutions in the first place.
Each of the ADA's myriad applications addresses a different historic problem
and has a distinctive Fourteenth Amendment justification. Respondents had enough
trouble squeezing their defense of the employment provisions into the allotted fifty
page brief limit, without undertaking a canvas of the entire ADA terrain.
The other reason that prompted counsel for respondents to limit their focus to the
employment provisions is their assumption that even if respondents win, the Court
on its own will limit its holding to employment. The Justices on the present Court
tend to be cautious and rarely decide more than is necessary to dispose of the case
before them. Given the diversity of provisions in the ADA, and the breadth of the
landscape covered by those provisions collectively, it is unlikely that five Justices will
coalesce in a decision in an employment case that upholds the Fourteenth
Amendment grounding of provisions wholly unrelated to employment. If
"employment alone" is the most that can be hoped for as a victory, then prudence
suggests limiting the case to that, both so that the employment provisions are not
jeopardized by judicial nervousness about the most expansive of the ADA's
provisions, and, conversely, so that if Garrett takes down the employment provisions,
it does not take down other provisions of the ADA that have different justifications,
such as the "most integrated setting" provision.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, has elected to defend the entirety of the
ADA in the brief for the United States. This no doubt reflects the somewhat different
interests of the United States (the Department of Justice administers the entirety of
Title I and would avoid years of future litigation if it could get the entire ADA
validated at one swoop). It may also reflect a reluctance on the part of the Solicitor
General's office, which plays a dual role as advocate and "officer of the court," not
to appear to be welching on a stipulation with which the grant of certiorari was
induced.235
234 A proposition that is debatable: as Cleburne demonstrated, there is still a "not in my
backyard" resistance to allowing group homes for the mentally retarded in the community. See
generally City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
235 Counsel for respondents are not similarly constrained, as their lack of "standing" to
litigate about the rest of the ADA means that they are dutiful to the Court's own standing
constraints. This excuse for acting inconsistently with the stipulation was not available to the
United States, which of course does have a stake in the entirety of the ADA.
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2. Should Respondents Argue that Disability Merits
Heightened Scrutiny?
The second delicate strategic choice respondents had to make was whether to
accept the premise of both Judge Easterbrook and the petitioners' brief-that
classifications based on disability do not receive heightened scrutiny and thus trigger
only rational basis review--or to affirmatively argue that the Court should hold that
disability classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny. It is widely believed
among lawyers that Cleburne settled the issue, by holding that mental retardation does
not receive heightened scrutiny. But the current status of Supreme Court decisional
law is actually muddier than generally recognized.
First, it is unsettled whether claims of disability discrimination are governed by
rational-basis scrutiny or by heightened scrutiny.236 Second, even if the label "rational
basis" is retained to describe the review accorded disability classifications, there is
reason to think that in practice the review will be more rigorous (and more likely to
trigger findings of denials of equal protection) than is true generally of categories
subjected to rational-basis review. As Justice Marshall demonstrated in his
concurrence in Cleburne, the majority's reasons for invalidating the zoning ordinance
in that case reflected a much more searching scrutiny of the proffered rationales for
the ordinance than is customary when the Court is evaluating traditional economic
legislation under the rational-basis standard.237 Moreover, the two Justices whose
votes were necessary to make an opinion for the Court in Cleburne, wrote separately
to state that they had joined that opinion only because they understood the Court to
be embracing a rational basis test that required balancing the justification for the
disability classification against the degree of injury it would inflict.238 The Court
appears to have done the same with respect to classifications based on sexual
orientation, declaring that such classifications receive only rational basis review but
implementing that standard with a balancing test.239 This balancing test goes far
beyond traditional rational-basis review (which legitimates the classification so long
as there is anything on the state's side of the scale, irrespective of what there might
236 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,335 n.1, 336-37 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating
that the Court declined to decide whether Cleburne remains the standard for mental retardation,
perhaps because of Congress's intervening factual findings in the ADA); Schweiker v. Wilson,
450 U.S. 221, 231 n.13 (1981) ("We therefore intimate no view as to what standard of review
applies to legislation expressly classifying the mentally ill as a discrete group.").
237 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring).
238 Id at 452 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurringjoined by Burger, C.J.).
239 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,635 (1996) ("Amendment 2 ... inflicts on [gays
and lesbians] immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate
justifications that maybe claimed for it.").
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be on the other). A review of disability classifications that requires "balancing" would
make the Fourteenth Amendment justification for the ADA's reasonable
accommodation provision much clearer, for that provision itself requires just such a
balance-the need for accommodation against hardship to the employer.
While counsel for respondents believed in the correctness of these avenues of
escape from the "rational basis" box that sank the ADEA and that Judge Easterbrook
used to sink the ADA, they believed as well that these are "hard sells" to any of the
five Justices in the current majority. As a result, counsel opted for a straddle. The
brief for respondents argues that even if traditional rational-basis review applies, the
ADA is still a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment 240 But in a footnote the brief states that if the Court does not agree, it
will have to address and resolve these uncertainties about the state of the law before
it can conclude that the ADA is unconstitutional.241
3. The Case for Upholding the ADA 's Employment Provisions as an
Appropriate Exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment Power
For respondents to prevail in Garrett, they must clear the two hurdles erected by
the Supreme Court's recent decisions. They must establish: (1) that the ADA was
addressing a serious problem of disability discrimination violative ofthe Constitution,
and (2) that the employment provisions of the ADA-insofar as they go beyond
forbidding merely what the Fourteenth Amendment forbids-are a congruent and
proportional response to that problem.
a. Hurdle Number One: Is There A Serious Problem of State Behavior
Violative of the Fourteenth Amendment?
While the brief for petitioners in Garrett focuses on, and attempts to negate, the
applicability of the "irrational and arbitrary" branch of the Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence, that brief ignores the other branch, the branch that holds that
invidiously-motivated actions violate equal protection. It is the latter that fuels the
briefs for respondents and the United States.
In Kimel, the Court rejected the employee's contention that widespread invidious
discrimination against the aged provided Congress an appropriate basis for exercising
its Section 5 power.242 The Court insisted that there is no animus in our society
toward the aged: each of us aspires to join their ranks. There is no we/they operative.
240 Brief for Respondents at 38-39, Univ. ofAla. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett (U.S. argued Oct. 11,
2000) (No. 99-1240).
241 Brief for Respondents at 16 n.18, Garrett (No. 99-1240).
242 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631,650 (2000) (to be published at 528 U.S. 62
(2000)).
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Congress enacted the ADEA not to combat irrational hostility toward the aged, but
to outlaw certain forms of economically rational employer behavior. Because mental
and physical agility do decline with age, it is economically rational for employers to
force out (or not hire) persons of advanced age. Of course, some of those persons will
have suffered no decline in agility, but to sort them out via individualized
determinations would be expensive and not wholly reliable. So, many employers,
including states, make the economically rational choice to overgeneralize and to use
age as a proxy for declining agility. When they do, they are not denying equal
protection.243
The Court had already held three times before Kimel that employment standards
based on generalizations about age, because economically rational, do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.244 These standards could not therefore, be a predicate for
Congress's exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment power.245 True, Congress was free,
in the exercise of its Commerce Clause power, to deprive employers, including states,
of this economically rational selection device. But Congress was not free to authorize
individual lawsuits against states to enforce this requirement as the Eleventh
Amendment bars private suits to enforce obligations imposed pursuant to Congress's
Commerce power.246
The key, then, to the holding in Kimel was the Court's conclusion that the aged
do not experience invidious discrimination, i.e., discrimination motivated by
prejudice rather than economic rationality.247 The Court doubted that there is
irrational or invidious age prejudice anywhere in our society, but at all odds there was
no evidence before Congress that such poisonous attitudes motivated state behavior,
and Congress did not purport to find otherwise. Instead, Congress attached the label
"discrimination" to the economically rational use of generalizations, which does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment 248
This is where the ADA parts company with the ADEA and where the effort to
use Kimel to invalidate the ADA fails. For in enacting the ADA, Congress
determined that the root cause of discrimination against persons with disabilities is
invidious prejudice, and Congress found pervasive employment discrimination
against persons with disabilities resulting from that prejudice.
243 Id. at 646.
244 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979);
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
245 Kinel, 120 S. Ct. at 645.
2 4 6 Id at 643.
247 Id. at 645.
248Id. at 649-50.
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i. The Root Causes ofDiscrimination against
Persons with Disabilities
In the "findings" recited in § 12101 of the ADA, Congress stated that the
isolation and segregation of persons with disabilities "continue[s] to be a serious and
pervasive social problem" 249 and that "the continuing existence of unfair and
unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the
opportunity to compete on an equal basis."250 These findings were amplified in the
committee reports on the ADA. Disability discrimination is "based on false
presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance,
irrational fears, and pericious mythologies."25' "Every government and private study
on the issue has shown that employers disfavor hiring persons with disabilities
because of stereotypes, discomfort, misconceptions, and unfounded fears about
increased cost and decreased productivity"; thus, the legislation was designed "to
provide a high degree of protection to eliminate [this] current pervasive bias. '2 52
These findings paralleled the Supreme Court's observation in SchoolBoard v. Arline,
cited in the committee reports, that "society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow
from actual impairment. '253 Congress recognized that these large engines of
249 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994).
250 § 12101(a)(9).
251 S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 7 (1989), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 267.
252 Id. at 37. Accord H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 40 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CA.N. 303 (showing that the legislation was aimed at "stereotypical assumptions, fears and
myths"); id. at 71 (explaining that the ADA was to "eliminate the pervasive bias"); id. at 75
(showing that at the time of the enactment there "still exist[ed] widespread irrational prejudice');
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445 (explaining the
"stereotypes, discomfort, [and] misconceptions" surrounding those with disabilities).
253 Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,284 (1987); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.SC.C.A.N. 267. See also ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
DIsABILIY RIGHTS MANDATES: FEDERAL AND STATE COMPLIANCE WITH EMPLOYMENT
PROTECTIONS AND ARCHITEClURAL BARRIER REMOVAL 20 (Apr. 1989) [hereinafter ACIR
REPORT]:
Probably the most significant barriers faced by persons with disabilities relate to the attitudes,
predispositions, and behaviors ofnondisabled persons. Such attitudes range from negative views
of disability to discomfort in associating with people who experience some form of disability. The
nature and extent of attitudes about disability have been documented through an extensive set of
research studies conducted in many settings. One common finding is that nonhandicapped people
tend to be preoccupied with disabling conditions and often are incapable of seeing beyond these
conditions to the whole person .... Such predispositions lead nondisabled persons to overlook or
ignore the full range of abilities of persons with disabilities.
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prejudice had generated an immense and intractable disability discrimination
problem.
Congress's findings as to the root causes of disability discrimination rested on a
firm evidentiary base. Congress relied heavily on a report prepared by the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, Accomodating the Spectrum.254 That report drawing
on extensive professional literature, detailed four "major types" of "prejudice" that
persons with disabilities encounter.255 Governmental action disadvantaging persons
with disabilities that is animated by any of these four violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
(a) DiscomfortAversion: "Psychological studies indicate that interaction with
handicapped people, particularly those with visible handicaps, commonly produces
feelings of discomfort and embarrassment in nonhandicapped people....
[H]andicapped people encounter the reaction of aversion every day"-a reaction
rooted in repulsion, fear, and embarrassment at interacting with such persons.256
Adverse governmental actions against persons with disabilities motivated by these
feelings violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the Court held in Cleburne.257
(b) Stigmatization: "A handicapping condition is frequently, albeit illogically,
viewed as a blameworthy characteristic or a badge of disgrace," and one who
possesses that condition is seen "as not quite human.' 258 "The professional literature
is full of discussions about the stigma associated with handicaps,"259 which is a
stigma that in some instances stems from "biblical references that seem to link
handicaps with sin, death, demons, and punishment" and in others from the
"aesthetic... high value our society places on physique, athletic prowess, beauty, and
intelligence. '260 As Congress noted, "our society is still infected by the ancient now
almost subconscious assumption that people with disabilities are less than fully
254 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL
ABarrIEs (1983) [hereinafter SPECmRUM]; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CA.N. 267; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 28 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303.
255 SPEClRUM, supra note 254, at 23-27.
256 I. at23.
257 City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448-49 (1985). See also
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (noting that a state may not "fence in the
harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different");
Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (holding that public discomfort vith a minority's
perceived differences is an unconstitutional ground for state action).
258 SPECiRUM, supra note 254, at 26.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 26 n.66. See also ACIR REPORT, supra note 253, at 20.
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human."261 Governmental action motivated by these negative, stigmatizing attitudes
is at the very core of what the Fourteenth Amendment forbids.262
(c) Stereotyping: Congress found that it was "strikingly clear" from the evidence
it received at the ADA hearings that "stereotypes and misconceptions about the
abilities, or more correctly the inabilities, of persons with disabilities are still
pervasive today."263 Many of the widely-held stereotypes about persons with
disabilities are simply myths, such as the ones that epilepsy and cancer are contagious,
cited in Arline, and the one that the HIV virus is transmittable by casual contact.
Other common disability stereotypes consist of false generalizations attributing
negative characteristics to persons with disabilities as a class, when in fact those
characteristics are no more prevalent among that class than among the population at
large. The Senate report addressed the false "group based fears" phenomenon by
describing a 1973 study that had "examined the job performance, safety record and
attendance of 1,452 physically impaired employees of E.I. duPont de Nemours and
Company" in order to "determine the validity of several concerns expressed by
employers with regard to hiring veterans with disabilities."264 The duPont study
found that, as to each of these concerns, the disabled workers performed as well as
or better than their nondisabled coworkers.265
Nonetheless, as the ACIR found seventeen years later, employment
discrimination against persons with disabilities based on "false stereotypes" persisted
in the public sector.266 The Report explained:
The reluctance of employers to hire persons with disabilities is rooted in common
myths and misunderstandings, including the notions that the employment of disabled
workers will increase insurance and worker compensation costs, lead to higher
absenteeism, harm efficiency and productivity, and require expensive accommodations.
261 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 8-9 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267 (quoting Justin
Dart). For an example ofjust how much "less than human," see id at 7 (detailing that a zookeeper
barred children with Downs Syndrome because he feared they would frighten the chimpanzees).
262 New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 nA0 (1979) (citing Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,373-74 (1886)); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703,710 (1885).
263 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 37 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267.
264 Id. at 28-29.
265 Id. Some specific findings of the study were as follows: Ninety-one percent ofDuPont's
disabled workers rated average or better in performance. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 29 (1989),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 267. Only four percent of the workers with disabilities were below
average in safety records; more than half were above average. Id. Ninety-three percent of the
workers with disabilities rated average or better with regard to job stability (turnover rate). Id.
Seventy-nine percent of the workers with disabilities rated average or better in attendance. Id.
26 6 ACIR REPORT, supra note 253, at 72-73.
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*. These attitudes, common to many employers in the United States, have persisted
despite empirical evidence from several quarters that disabled workers perform at levels
equal to or superior to other employees. 267
Denying persons with disabilities equal access to the workplace on the basis of
myths or false generalizations plainly violates the Equal Protection Clause.268 Indeed,
as Justice Kennedy pointed out in Olmstead, "[u]nderlying much discrimination law
is the notion that animus can lead to false and unjustified stereotypes, and vice versa.
Of course, the line between animus and stereotype is often indistinct."
26 9
Furthermore, adverse action based on either violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Nothing said by the Court in Kimel is to the contrary. The Court there addressed
a conceptually different kind of generalization-one that, while not true of every
individual in the class or group, is recognized as being true on average, vz, that older
workers on average would be less productive than younger workers on average.270
Additionally, the Court dealt there with a class (older persons), which the Court
concluded had not been subject to a "'history ofpurposeful unequal treatment.'2 71
Nothing in Kimel remotely suggests that action taken in reliance on a myth or on a
stereotype that wrongly attributes to a historically disfavored class a characteristic no
truer of that class than of the public at large has a rational basis. Of course, Cleburne
belies just that proposition, as does United States v. Virginia.272
(d) Paternalism: Often, persons with disabilities suffer from actions that "spare"
them the "rigors" of ordinary life that, in fact, they earnestly desire to confront and
267 Id. at21.
268 City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985). The Court
found that the zoning ordinance, which excluded group homes for persons with mental retardation,
was violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This is because the ordinance was predicated on the
city's belief that persons with mental retardation create a "special hazard," disturb the "serenity of
the neighborhood," and pose "danger to others," yet fraternity houses and college dormitories that
pose similar dangers were allowed---"it is difficult to believe that the groups of mildly or
moderately mentally retarded individuals who would live at 201 Featherston would present any
different or special hazard." IM See also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 612 (1999) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (indicating that treating persons with disabilities differently from the public
generally "without adequate justification" is discrimination).
269 Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 611.
270 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 646 (2000) (to be published at 528 U.S. 62
(2000)).
2 71 Id at 645 (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,313 (1976) (quoting San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, (1973))). In that context, the Court held
that action in reliance on such a generalization has a rational basis. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 646-47.
272 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541-42 (1996) (use of overbroad generalizations
that tend to perpetuate historical stereotypes about a disfavored class violates the Equal Protection
Clause).
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that they are fully capable of handling.273 Congress concluded from its ADA hearings
that "[i]t is critical that paternalistic concerns for the disabled person's own safety not
be used to disqualify an otherwise qualified applicant [for employment]." 274
However "well-intentioned," such paternalism is another form of
unconstitutional discrimination. "Traditionally, [unconstitutional gender]
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in
practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage. ' 275
ii. State Employment Discrimination Resulting from
Prejudice Against Persons with Disabilities
A congressionally-created agency, the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR)276-a majority of whose members were state
and local govemmental officials277-- published and distributed to each member of
Congress, 278 while the ADA was under consideration, a report addressing, inter alia,
why so few persons with disabilities were employed by the states.279 The report
described the results of a survey the commission conducted of "officials in state
273 See SPECTRUM, supra note 254, at 24.
274 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 38 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267.
275 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion); see also United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 538, 549-50, n.20. Cf STAFFOFTHE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION
AND LABOR, 101ST CONG., 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PuBic LAw 101-336: THE AMERICANS
WIH DISABu .S Acr 1640, n.7 (Comm. Print 1990) (citation omitted) (witness cited a study,
which found "a positive relationship... between tendencies to pity blind people on the one hand,
and the tendency to espouse community segregation for the blind on the other").
276 The ACIR was created as a permanent, bipartisan commission to give continuing study
to the relationship among local, state, and national levels of government Advisory Committee on
Intergovernmental Relations Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-380,73 Stat. 703 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 4272 (1994)). Among its statutory functions was to "make available technical assistance to the
executive and legislative branches of the Federal Government in the review of proposed legislation
to determine its overall effect on the Federal system." § 4272
277 The Commission had twenty members at the time this report was published: two
governors, three members of state legislatures, three mayors, three county officials, six members
of Congress (three from each house), the U.S. Attorney General, and two private citizens. ACIR
REPORT, supra note 253, at inside front cover.
278 A letter from the former Executive Director of the ADA, appended to the Brief for
Respondents in Garrett, reports that the ACIR report was sent"to all the elected members of the
United States Congress in May 1989." Even before the report was published, the central finding
contained in the draft of the ACIR Report was described in testimony to Congress. STAFF OFTHE
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 101ST CONG., 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW
101-336: THE AMERIcANS wrni DISABrrIES Acr 1614 (Comm. Print 1990).
279 See ACIR REPORT, supra note 253.
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agencies." 280 A large percentage (82.7%) of the state officials polled declared that
"negative attitudes" or "misconceptions by employers about the work capabilities of
persons with disabilities" had either a "strong" or "moderate" impact on state
employment of persons with disabilities.281
In addition, ACIR invited state officials to provide narratives stating what they
thought was impeding the states' employment of more persons with disabilities:
State... public officials... reiterated the significant and often negative impact of public
and employer attitudes toward persons with disabilities. Such attitudes have multiple
dimensions, including feelings of discomfort in associating with disabled individuals,
[and] inaccurate assessments of their productivity... [State officials] expressed strong
distress at the prominence of these attitudes and the difficulty in changing them.282
Other studies before Congress reached similar conclusions. In 1969, A study
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Labor had reported:
In general, observations made during the field research suggested that job opportunities
for the handicapped were even more circumscribed in the public than in the private
sector.... While state and local governments are becoming increasingly important as
employers, their policies on hiring the handicapped are not improving
accordingly.. . [M]any have rigid physical examination requirements which may be
quite irrelevant to the demands of the jobs in question ... These requirements appear to
be based on outmoded assumptions about the capacities of the handicapped and also on
the belief that there are widespread aversions to visible handicaps which would lower
public confidence in the employee.2 83
280 Id[
281 Id., at 72-73, 120 (showing the following statistics: 34.7% said "strong," 48.0%
"moderate," 10.7% "weak," and 2.0% 'one").
2 82 Id at 73.
2 8 3 GREN=EIGH ASSOC., INC., A STUDY TO DEVELOP A MODELFOR EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
FOR THE HANDICAPPED 121-22 (1969) [hereinafter GREENLEIGH STUDY], cited in STAFF OFTHE
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 101sT CONG., 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBuC LAW
101-336: THE AMERICANS wrrH DSABILIIES Acr 1640, 1621-22 (Comm. Print 1990) (testimony
to Congress). A 1972 study by the Texas Rehabilitation Committee made similar findings with
respect to state employment in Texas. TEX. REHAB. COMMISSION, EXCERPTS &
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE WORKPLACE FOR PLACEMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED N STATE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE 1-5 (1972) [hereinafter TEXAS REPORT]. The report found, inter alia, that
"front-line supervisors" had "qualms" about working with persons with disabilities, and there was
a "social stigma" that deterred hiring of such persons. Additionally, an in-depth study of state
employment in New York after enactment of the ADA showed that these problems have persisted
even after the ADA's enactment SHARON L. HARLAN & PAMELAM. ROBERT, DISABILy IN WORK
ORGANIZATIONS: BARRIERTO EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrIY, FINALREPORT xiii (1995) (finding that
persons with disabilities seeking employment with the state "confront stereotypes, ignorance,
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Congress was advised of a study of twenty-three public jurisdictions showing,
inter alia, that none was willing to hire blind applicants, that many excluded
applicants with a history of cancer, and that one even had a written standard
prohibiting the hiring of an amputee for any job unless he or she made use of a
prosthesis, even though it might not be required for success on the job.284 Still
another study, conducted by the American Cancer Society, found that most
government agencies in California discriminated in hiring of applicants for an average
of five years after treatment for cancer.285 On the basis of this and other sources,
Congress found that "there still exists widespread irrational prejudice against persons
with cancer."286 Congress also took note of the 1989 report of President Bush's
Commission on the HIV Epidemic on the need for legal constraints to prevent
discrimination against persons with symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV infection.287
Witnesses at hearings on the ADA recounted numerous instances of exclusion
of persons with disabilities from public employment based on aversion and irrational
fear. The committee reports note "a case in which a woman 'crippled by arthritis' was
denied a job, not because she could not do the work but because 'college trustees
[thought] normal students shouldn't see her,' 2 88 and another in which a person was
denied a public school teacher job because she was in a wheelchair.2 89 Congress
misinformation, fear and pity that impede progress toward equal opportunity).
284 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 557 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor andHuman Res., 100th Cong. 80 (1988).
2 85 STAFFOFTHE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 101ST CONG., 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OFPUBuC LAW 101-336: THE AMERICANS WrIH DIsABnlEs AcT 1619 (Comm. Print
1990).
286 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 39-40 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 267. See also the
Supreme Court's observation in School Board v. Arline, a public employment disability
discrimination case, that "[e]ven those who suffer or have recovered from such noninfectious
diseases as epilepsy or cancer have faced discrimination based on the irrational fear that they may
be contagious." 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (footnote omitted); Barbara Hoffiman, Employment
Discrimination Based on Cancer History: The Needfor Federal Legislation, 59 TEMPLE L. Q. 1,
2-9 (1986) (describing reasons for employment discrimination against persons with cancer
histories and finding that such discrimination exists in both public and private employment).
287 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 19 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267. A member of
the National Commission on AIDS testified to Congress, "remember, Ryan White, denied entry
to school. The Ray family, burned from their home. A woman with AIDs denied entry with her
children to a public swimming pool. A bright young attorney... fired from his job." STAFF OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 101ST CONG., 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBuC LAW
101-336: THE AMERIcANs wrrH DiSABmrES AcT 1995 (Comm. Print 1990). See also Cain v.
Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671,680 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that lIlV positive individuals are "widely
stereotyped as indelibly miasmic, untouchable, physically and morally polluted").
288 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 7 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267; H.R. REP. NO.
101-485, pt. 2, at 30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303.
289 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 7; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 30.
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heard testimony that a professor of veterinary medicine at a state university was fired
when it was discovered that he had AIDS.290 Senator Durenberger told of a highly
qualified applicant who was turned down for ajob at the Metropolitan Twin Cities
Hospital because "her fellow employees would not be comfortable working with a
person as disabled as [she was]."2 91 Still additional instances were cited in a report
of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.292
Congressman Major Owens, who chaired a subcommittee considering the ADA,
appointed a Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with
Disabilities, which conducted sixty-three public forums and compiled a massive
documentary file of personal accounts of disability discrimination.293 A number of
the accounts describe instances of discriminatory conduct in state and local
government employment.294 Numerous additional instances of invidious
290 Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing on S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor
andHuman Resources, 101st Cong. 404 (1989) (testimony of National Organizations Responding
to AIDS).
291 136 CONG. REc. 17,368 (1987).
292 See Spectrum, supra note 254, at 21 (explaining that an Alabama National Guard officer
was terminated with no benefits when it was learned that he had been diagnosed with depression
and anxiety some twenty-five years earlier); id. (showing that a laborer employed by State
Conservation Corps. was subjected to workplace harassment and public ridicule by superior
because of his mental retardation); id at 22 (explaining that a city bus driver was subjected to
supervisory harassment, ridicule, and pressure to resign because of mental illness).
2 93 STAFF OF THBE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 101 ST CONG., 2 LEGIsLATIVE
HISTORY OF PUBUC LAW 10 1-336: THEAMERICANS WrIH DIsABunEsAcr 1324-25 (Comn. Print
1990). The documentary file is now in the possession of the President's Committee on
Employment of People with Disabilities. JONATHAN M. YOUNG, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
DISABILrrY, EQUALrrY OF OPPORTUNrY: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICANS wrTH DISABLimTEs Acr
211 (1997). The documents are indexed at the President's Committee in folders by state and by
numbers within each folder. The citations infra note 294 identify the state and the number of the
cited document within that state's folder.
2 94 STAFFOFPRSIDE'S COMM. ON PEOPLE WITH DISABImiTIES, 101st CONG., TASKFORCE
ON THE RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF AMERICANS wriH DISABILrIES (1989). A health
administrator walked into a job interview with a department head at the University of North
Carolina, who immediately said, "Ah-if I knew you were blind I wouldn't have bothered bringing
you in for an interview." Id. at N.C. 173. A student at a state university was denied the ability to
student teach and thus earn his teaching certificate because "[t]he Dean of the School of Education
at that time and his successor were convinced that blind people could not teach in public schools.'
Id at S.D. 57. An employee of the Kansas Department of Transportation was fired "for the stated
reason that I have epilepsy" despite exceeding the department's daily output requirement. Id. at
Kan. 3. "Deaf workers at the University of Oklahoma are being paid a lower salary than their
hearing workers and are required to perform the same work."Id at Okla. 26. The State of Indiana's
personnel office informed a woman with a hidden disability that she should not disclose her
disability if she wanted to obtain employment Id at Ind. 7. A state college administrator who was
blind prevailed on a disability discrimination claim when he was not rehired despite positive
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discrimination in public employment were described in published lower court
decisions predating the ADA.2 95
The state agency petitioners in Garrett argued in their brief that because most
states had laws forbidding disability discrimination by the state at the time the ADA
evaluations. Id. at Mass. 9. Despite having a higher score for training and experience than the
sighted person who was hired, a blind applicant was denied the position of Director of State
Services for the Blind. Id. at Minn. 13. A school teacher was denied a permanent position because
she wears braces and walks with canes. Id at Miss. 33. A lifeguard who worked for three summers
at a city pool was denied a permanent job because he had epilepsy, even though he had not had a
seizure since childhood. Id at Ga. 4. A job seeker looking for a position with a public library was
told, "they had already hired someone with a disability and they had met their quota." Id. at Wis.
55. A municipality initially told a summer job applicant that he would not be interviewed because
he was in a wheelchair and then gave him a different interview than other applicants. Id. at Ark.
30. A blind teacher repeatedly has been told that she is not qualified for a position because the
school needs a football coach; "In each case, a sighted person, who does not coach football, ha[d]
been hired." Id. at Utah 75. A teacher's aide with a visual impairment was told "point blank that
the reason I wasn't hired to work with children was because of the way my eyes were, that the
children would, 'try to imitate me."' Id. at Ill. 151. One writer summed up his experience, "rather
than relate one specific example, as a state employee I daily see covert discrimination in hiring or
not hiring people with disabilities with no reason given specifically." Id. at S.D. 46.
295 Chalk v. U.S. Cent. Dist. Ct. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1988) (reversing denial
ofinjunction sought byteacher with AIDS who was excluded from classroom teaching and noting
that "[tlo allow the court to base its decision on the fear and apprehension of others would fiustrate
the goals of section 504"); Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th
Cir. 1981) (upholding injunction granting doctor with multiple sclerosis admission to psychiatry
residency program and noting that the Chairman of the Department stated that "Dr. Pushkin 'is
teachable, but to face the devastation, guilt, pity, and rage that can be stirred up in his patients by
his physical condition appears to be too much to ask of his patients or of him'). See also generally
Recanzone v. Washoe County Sch. Dist, 696 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Nev. 1988) (showing that a highly
praised substitute teacher with no right hand, a left hand with three digits, and a speech impediment
prevailed on a discrimination claim that she was denied a permanent contract while less qualified,
nondisabled candidates were granted such contracts); Fiesel v. Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 363
(E.D.N.Y. 1980), affd at 675 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1982). A teacher with spina bifida alleged that she
initially had been denied a teaching license on the basis of a finding that she was physically "not
fit" and thus was entitled to additional seniority. The case was dismissed on statute of limitations
grounds. Id See also Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982,987-88 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (holding
unconstitutional school district's initial policy of totally excluding blind persons as teachers). The
court also found that the teacher's evaluation was based "on misconceptions and stereotypes about
the blind and on assumptions that the blind simply cannot perform." Id., af'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d
Cir. 1977). Federal employment is also not immune to disability discrimination. See Fowler v.
United States, 633 F.2d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1980) (explaining that the federal government
showed no rational basis for denying a termination hearing to a worker with mental retardation,
while providing hearings to those without such a disability); Smith v. Fletcher, 393 F. Supp. 1366,
1368 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (noting that federal employee with paraplegia who had a master's degree
was assigned menial clerical tasks because her supervisor made "an arbitrary and unfounded
decision as to her physical capabilities"), modified, 559 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1977).
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was enacted, it was evident that states did not harbor the invidious motivation that
would be necessary to render otherwise rational state behavior a violation of the Equal
Protection clause.296 Congress was aware of those laws. But Congress embraced the
assessment of the "fifty State Governors' committees... who report[ed] that existing
state laws do not adequately counter such acts of discrimination.' 297 Indeed, a 1986
study of state laws found that only eight states had substantive provisions as
protective as section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act (the precursor to the
ADA).298 Congress also concluded, from the massive evidence of continuing
disability discrimination, that the Rehabilitation Act "is also inadequate."299
Congress concluded that prophylactics against pretextual decisionmaking are
required if discrimination that is invidiously motivated is to be rooted out;3°° such
prophylactics are provided in the employment provisions of the ADA.30 1 But many
state laws did not contain any such prophylactic and virtually none contained the
range provided in the ADA.30 2
In any event, the enactment of state laws banning disability discrimination did
not wash away all the state actor hostility toward persons with disabilities. These laws,
whatever their insufficiencies, do, of course, suggest that state legislators are not
hostile to persons with disabilities. But most disability discrimination comes, as in the
two cases consolidated in Garrett, from ad hoc decisions made by individual
personnel officers and supervisors-state actors who are functioning outside the
public spotlight, without accountability, without the need to secure the concurrence
of other decisionmakers, and without a detailed record of what has motivated their
decisions. As the ACIR learned from state officials, the "negative attitudes" and
"stereotypes and misconceptions" that are at the root of state employment
2 96 Brief for Petitioners at 32-33, 37, Garrett (No. 99-1240).
297 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 18 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267.
298 Jant A. Flaccus, Handicap Discrimination Legislation: With Such Inadequate Coverage
at the Federal Level, Can State Legislation Be ofAny Help?, 40 ARK. L. REv. 261,322 (1986).
Congress was informed of this study at the hearings. STAFF OF THE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR,
101st CONG., 2 LEGIsLAThvE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW 101-336: THE AMmCANS WUH DISABMIrIES
ACT 1641 (Comm. Print 1990). As the title of the study suggests, because the Rehabilitation Act
covered only employers who receive federal funds, most state laws covered a larger number of
employers, albeit with weaker protections. Contrary to Petitioners' depiction, Brief for Petitioner
at 33-34, Garrett (No. 99-1240), "many" of these state laws were enacted after the Rehabilitation
Act and were following "the federal government's lead." ACIR REPORT, supra note 253, at 59.
299 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 18 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267.
300 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 37; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 71 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303.
301 See infra notes 309-37 and accompanying text.
302 For example, nearly half the states at the time the ADA was enacted had no reasonable
accommodation requirement, and many others had very weak accommodation provisions. Flaccus,
supra note 298, at 305-08.
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discrimination against persons with disabilities come from 'he middle management
level where most employment decisions are made."30 3
Congress had every reason to believe, as the evidence before it showed, that such
state actors, who are not in the public spotlight and do not document their decisional
rationales, had not been deterred by (and would not in the future be deterred by) the
limited legislation then on the books. Additionally, if the Court is faithful to its first-
quartet precedents, '1he adequacy of... alternative remedies" is ajudgment Congress
is best situated to make and one to which the courts owe substantial deference. 304
Indeed, this should be especially true of disability law, where the Court has observed
that the legislature's superior institutional capacity is at its zenith: "How this large and
diversified group is to be treated under the law is a difficult and often a technical
matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals and not by
the perhaps uninformed opinions of the judiciary."30 5
b. Hurdle Number Two: Congruence and Proportionality
If the Garrett respondents persuade the Court that there was a serious problem
of unconstitutional discrimination against persons with disabilities, they will have
cleared the first hurdle erected by City ofBoerne and Kimel. That will bring them to
the second hurdle: establishing that the ADA's employment provisions are
"congruent and proportional" to the constitutional problem. The Court has repeatedly
declared, in both the first and second quartets, that Congress, when confronted with
a serious problem of invidiously motivated public discrimination, may use its Section
5 power to enact "prophylactic" legislation-banning practices with disparate effects
in order to assure that invidiously-motivated practices do not escape detection.306 It
is respondents' contention in Garrett that the ADA is such a statute and, further, that
the ADA's substantive provisions are carefully tuned to the problem and carefully
measured so as not to intrude unnecessarily on the states' legitimate interests as
employers.
The ADA's employment provisions take the form of a general ban on
discrimination based on disability elaborated by a set of discrete requirements aimed
at preventing such discrimination. Here is how the respondents in Garrett have
argued that each of these provisions, separately and together, are a congruent and
proportional response to the problem Congress found.
3 03 ACIR REPORT, supra note 253, at 73; Watson & Trust v. Fort Work Bank, 487 U.S. 977,
990 (1988) (noting that while top executives maybe well intentioned, "[ilt does not follow... that
the particular supervisors to whom ... discretion is delegated always act without discriminatory
intent"). See also TEXAS REPORT, supra note 283.
3 04 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,653 (1996).
305 City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,443 (1985).
306 See cases discussed supra notes 131-94 and accompanying text.
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i. Each of the Employment Provisions of the ADA
Serves an Important Deterrent Function
(a) The General Ban on Disability Discrimination
Section 12112(a) contains a "general rule" that states are not to engage in
employment discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability "because
of the disability of such individual." 307 This general rule, in its terms, is addressed to
state employment actions that are unconstitutional under such Equal Protection
Clause decisions as Cleburne and, in its most literal and limited sense, is a rule that
"enforces" the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Fourteenth
Amendment does not standing alone, confer a cause of action upon individuals who
suffer constitutional violations, as states are not "persons" suable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,308 and as Congress had strong evidence of such state employment
discrimination, the provision creating that cause of action is the clearest example of
proper Section 5 legislation.
(b) Banning Treatment Based on Stereotypes
Section 12112(b)(1) declares that "discrimination" within the meaning of the
statute includes: "limiting, segregating, or classifying ajob applicant or employee in
a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee
because of the disability of such applicant or employee."30 9 The Senate and House
reports make clear that this provision is aimed at the practice of making employment
decisions based on disability-based stereotypes. The provision targets both differential
treatment based on such stereotypes (such as separate lines of progression, pay scales,
or work places for persons with disabilities) and failure to consider persons with
disabilities for employment based on stereotypes.310
State action based on stereotypes that are totally false or that do not distinguish
persons in the disfavored class from the rest of the public are unconstitutional. But
§ 12112(b)(1) goes a step further by banning all disability-based stereotypes,
including the kinds that the Court declared in Kimel are not unconstitutional (i.e.,
stereotypes that are truer ofpersons with disabilities as a class than of others, although
not true of each individual in the disfavored class).311 Even for this latter type of
307 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
308 Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,71 (1989).
309 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (1994).
3 10 S. REP.No. 101-116, at 28-29 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267;
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 58, and pt. 3, at 31, 36 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445.
311 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (to be published at 528 U.S. 62
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stereotype, the requirement of individualized inquiry is an appropriate prophylactic.
Congress knew that that there was widespread invidious prejudice against persons
with disabilities and that stereotypes used by state and local employers often were
reflections of (or "covers" for) employment decisions based on prejudice or irrational
fear.3 12 Against this background, "individualized inquiry" is "essential' if the statute
"is to achieve its goal of protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations based
on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear."313 This distinguishes the ADA in a
crucial way from the ADEA, given the Court's conclusion in Kmel that older persons
are not subjected to invidious discrimination.
(c) Banning Non-Job-Related Qualification Standards That Have the Effect
of Screening out Persons with Disabilities
Although not invoked in the complaints of either of the respondents in Garrett,
there are three provisions of the ADA that ban rules and practices that screen out
persons with disabilities and that are not job-related and consistent with business
necessity. The statute defines "discrimination" to include the use of "standards,
criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discrimination on the
basis of disability."314 This requirement is particularized as to "qualification
standards, employment tests, or other selection criteria."315 These definitions are
qualified by §§ 12113(a) and 12112(b)(6), which afford the employer a defense ifit
can show the use to be "job-related and consistent with business necessity," and by
§ 12113(b), which permits the use of qualification standards that disqualify
individuals who would "pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals
in the workplace."316
It is, of course, a staple of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not ban state action merely because of its disparate impact 317 But
the Court has also recognized that disparate impact can be an indicia of an improperly
discrininatory purpose in adopting a facially neutral rule.318 In consequence, the
Court has repeatedly recognized that, when confronting a problem of public
(2000)).
3 12 See, e.g., GREENLEIGH STUDY, supra note 284, at 283.
313 Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,287 (1987).
3 14 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (1994).
315 §§ 12112(b)(6), (7).
316 § 12112(b)(6).
317 Pers. Admin'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,273 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, -
248 (1976).
3 18 Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 489 (1997); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275
(citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252,265 (1977).
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discrimination fueled by prejudice against an unpopular group, "Congress can
prohibit laws with discriminatory effects in order to prevent... discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause."319
Congress explained that the purpose of the disparate impact provisions in the
ADA is precisely to assure that facial neutrality does not shield invidious
discrimination:
The requirement that job criteria actually measure ability required by the job is a critical
protection against discrimination based on disability. As was made strikingly clear at the
hearings on the ADA, stereotypes and misconceptions about the abilities, or more
correctly the inabilities, of persons with disabilities are still pervasive today. Every
government and private study on the issue has shown that employers disfavor hiring
persons with disabilities because of stereotypes, discomfort misconceptions, and
unfounded fears.320
Against that background, both the House and Senate reports declare the
regulation of practices with disparate effects to be one of three "pivotal" commands
that "work together to provide a high degree of protection to eliminate the current
pervasive bias against employing persons with disabilities in the selection process."321
Congress's explanation parallels the Supreme Court's explanation of the similar
provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.322
Of course, not every practice with disparate impact on persons with disabilities
will be the product of conscious or subconscious prejudice. Congress so recognized,
and through §§ 12112(b)(6) and 12113(a) and (b), exempted from the ADA's ban
those rules and practices with disparate impact that are least likely to rest on disability
prejudice: those where the employer has strongjustification for using the criterion-
business necessity or concern for safety.323
319 City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,529 (1997) (citing City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980)).
320 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 37 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 267.
321 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 37; H.R REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 71 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303.
322 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (stating that disparate-
impact analysis safeguards against decisions motivated by discriminatory intent, and "even ifone
assumed that any such discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate treatment
analysis, the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain") (emphasis
added).
323 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-13 (1994). Moreover, only those claimants who can prove that they
are "qualified" for the job they are seeking are eligible to assert a claim under the ADA, so that
decisions based correctly on lack of credentials (another common ground for rejection that is
unlikely to be unconstitutional) are insulated from challenge.
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To be sure, even with these limits, the possibility exists that these disparate-
impact provisions will ban some facially neutral practices that in fact are not
motivated by prejudice. But, Congress was not required to choose a standard that
risked being underprotective of constitutional rights. Congress, faced with sufficient
evidence of a serious risk of unconstitutional behavior, may ban facially neutral state
practices outright, without allowing the state or local government any opportunity to
defend those laws as serving a nondiscriminatory purpose, even though the practices
would not violate the Constitution unless poorly motivated. Indeed, in each of the
first-quartet cases, the Court upheld a statute ofjust that type.324 Afortiori, Congress
is entitled to allow a defense that is not so broad that prejudicial conduct can be
smuggled under its cover.
The statutes invalidated in City of Boerne and Kimel did not represent
appropriate exercises of this power because the Court found that the evidence before
Congress did not suggest any significant likelihood that there would be substantial
amounts of governmental discrimination based on religion or age, and without a
likelihood of such discrimination, there was no warrant for adopting a prophylactic
approach to prevent such discrimination.325 Without such a likelihood, the
substitution of an effects test would invalidate constitutional behavior
disproportionately to any limited prophylactic purpose it would serve. But in the
ADA, Congress concluded that the danger of continuing unconstitutional
discrimination was very great, both because of the volume of recent discriminatory
actions and the pervasiveness of the societal prejudices that were likely to animate
such discrimination. 326
(d) Requiring Reasonable Accommodation
Section 12112(b)(5)(A) defines "discrimination" to include: "not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
324 See generally City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (upholding a
nationwide ban on changes in electoral schemes with discriminatory effects, regardless of whether
the state was invidiously motivated in adopting the changes); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970) (upholding nationwide ban on literacy tests for voting regardless of motive); Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding congressional ban on English-language eligibility
requirement for voting, irrespective of whether the requirement was adopted with a bad motive);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding congressional ban on literacy tests
for voting, although such tests violate Fifteenth Amendment only if invidiously motivated).
325 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631,649-50 (2000) (to be published at 528 U.S.
62 (2000)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
326 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 8-9 (1989), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 167.
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an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity."327
Reasonable accommodation is available only to applicants or employees who are
otherwise qualified for the job. Even as to qualified applicants or employees, it is not
a violation to refuse an accommodation that would cause an undue hardship to the
employer. "Undue hardship" is defined in the statute as "requiring significant
difficulty or expense, when considered in light of' the "nature and cost of the
accommodation," the financial impact on the employer, and the nature of the
employer's operation.328
Many persons with disabilities who are fully competent to perform a job need
some adjustment of the physical environment because of their disability. It is an easy
matter for a supervisor or personnel officer who in fact is animated by disability
prejudice, and not by concern about the often minor cost of providing the
accommodation, 329 to conceal his true motivation by invoking the cost of the
accommodation as a "neutral" justification for denying employment opportunities to
persons with disabilities. As EEOC Commissioner Evan Kemp testified at a
congressional hearing on the ADA, if employers "want[ ] disabled people, the
accommodations really don't become a burden. If they don't, they always do."330 The
ACIR reported to Congress that "sometimes the only real impediment [to
accommodation] is the perception of the supervisor... [A]rguments about
accommodation costs are used as a smokescreen to mask the real reasons for not
hiring a person with a mental or physical disability. '331
For these reasons, Congress concluded that the reasonable accommodation
provision of the ADA is, along with the disparate impact provision, one of the
"pivotal provisions" necessary "to provide a high degree of protection to eliminate the
current pervasive bias against employing persons with disabilities."332 Congress had
ample justification for this conclusion. The Supreme Court, in Cleburne, observed
that "a civilized and decent society expects" its government to accommodate the
differences of persons with disabilities.333 Given the pervasiveness of prejudice
327 § 12112(b)(5)(A).
328 § 12111(10).
329 Congress found that "'many typical accommodations' can be provided for under $50,"
although, of course, some required accommodations would be more expensive. S. REP. No. 101-
116, at 10. See also supra notes 276-79; ACIR Report, supra note 253, at 73 ("Studies show[ ]
that most workplace accommodations involve little cost.") The accommodations sought in Garrett
by Respondent Ash reflect this, see text at supra note 35.
330 H.R. REP. No 101-485, pt. 2, at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303 (quoting
STAFFOF THE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 101SrCoNG., 2 LEGISLATIVE mHSTORY OFPUBUC
LAW 101-336: THEAMRICANS wrrH DSABRInEs ACr 1552 (Comm. Print 1990)).
331 ACIR REPORT, supra note 253, at 75.
332 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 37 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 167.
333 City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985) (emphasis
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against persons with disabilities, when a state actor fails to do what a civilized and
decent society expects and cites costs that do not constitute an undue hardship to the
state as the ground for rejecting the applicant who would otherwise be most
qualified,334 there is every reason to suspect that prejudice, and not cost;, underlies the
refusal.
Congress was also persuaded that the reasonable accommodation provision was
necessary to assure that false stereotypes about disability not result in false
assumptions of what it would cost to accommodate a person with disability and thus
in resultant unwillingness to accommodate. "Stereotypes about disability can result
in stereotypes about the need for accommodations, which may exceed what is actually
required."335
Here, then, as in the case of disparate impact, Congress proceeded reasonably in
concluding that discriminatory intent cannot be "adequately policed through disparate
treatment analysis," and even if it could, "the problem of subconscious stereotypes
and prejudices would remain."336 Furthermore, in acting on that understanding,
Congress proceeded in a proportionate manner, limiting the scope of the reasonable
accommodation provision so that it did not invalidate state action in those contexts
where it was likeliest to be motivated by legitimate interests. Thus, an employer: (1)
need not even consider a candidate who is not qualified, (2) need not select a
qualified candidate with a disability even if with reasonable accommodation he or she
would not be the best candidate, (3) need not incur undue hardship, and (4) need not
act in any way that would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others.337
added).
334 The reasonable accommodation provision does not oblige the employer to select a
candidate with a disability, but only to evaluate his or her candidacy without taking into account
the need to provide the reasonable accommodation. The candidate will be entitled to the job only
if, with the need for accommodation removed from the calculus, he or she emerges as the best
candidate.
335 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445.
336 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988).
337 There are four other substantive employment provisions in the ADA, whose role in
preventing discrimination are discussed in this footnote. The Act bans pre-employment inquiries
ofjob applicants as to whether they have disabilities and medical examinations prior to an offer
of employment, which may be conditioned on satisfying a medical examination. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d) (1994). Congress explained that these practices were "often used to exclude applicants
with disabilities-particularly those with so-called hidden disabilities such as epilepsy, diabetes,
emotional illness, heart disease, and cancer-before their ability to perform the job was even
evaluated." S. REP. No. 101-116, at 39 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 167. Banning
them, until the employer is otherwise prepared to offer ajob, "is critical to assure that bias does not
enter the selection process." Id.
Section 12112(b)(2) forbids an employer to participate in a contractual or other arrangement
with referral agencies, labor unions, and others, when such arrangements result in discriminatory
selection or treatment of the employer's workforce. Section 12112(b)(4) forbids an employer to
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ii. Nationwide Scope ofADA Is Congruent and Proportional
In Oregon v. Mitchell,338 eight Justices concluded that it is within Congress's
Section 5 power to enact nationwide prophylactic provisions when the evidence
before Congress suggests that a problem is widespread, even though Congress lacks
specific evidence that every state has or is likely to engage in unconstitutional
behavior.339 The prevalence of disability prejudice that Congress found knows no
geographic bounds, and Congress had evidence of discriminatory actions animated
by that prejudice throughout the nation.340 Congress concluded from that evidence
that there is a nationwide virus of prejudice: "our society is still infected by
the... assumption that people with disabilities are less than fully human."341 It was
more than reasonable for Congress to conclude that the prophylactics in the ADA
should have nationwide application.
While the Court disapproved the nationwide scope of the statutes in City of
Boerne and Kimel, in each of those cases the Court found that there was little if any
evidence that any state had or was likely to violate the Constitution.342 In that setting,
it is understandable that the Court found a nationwide ban incongruent. That is not
the setting of the ADA.
iii. The Absence of a Sunset Provision Is Not Fatal to Congruence or
Proportionality
In City ofBoerne and Kimel, the Court cited the absence of a sunset provision-a
time limit on the obligations imposed on the states-as a factor relevant to the Court's
conclusion that the statutes lacked congruence and proportionality.343 Petitioners in
discriminate against an individual "because of the known disability' of another with whom the
individual "is known to have a relationship or association." These provisions are aimed at deterring
unconstitutional conduct in the same manner as those discussed in the text.
Finally, § 12203 forbids discrimination against an individual for opposing a practice made
unlawful bythe ADA or for seeking a legal remedy for such violations. The provision is obviously
appropriate to assure that the central goals of the ADA are not eroded by employer coercion.
Indeed, it may well be that if a state retaliates against an employee who seeks legal remedy from
the federal government, the state would be violating the constitutional right to petition the federal
government and/or the individual's privileges and immunities of federal citizenship. See Nash v.
Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967) (noting but not deciding the issue).
338 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
3 3 9 Id. at 147 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 216 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 236
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 283-84 (Stewart, J., concurring).
340 See supra notes 276-303 and accompanying text.
341 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 8-9 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 267.
342 See supra notes 118 & 137.
343 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631,644-45 (2000) (to be published at 528 U.S.
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Garrett argue that the ADA fails the congruence and proportionality test because it
does not contain an automatic sunset provision. While that is a relevant factor to
consider in evaluating congruence and proportionality, City ofBoerne recognized that
it is not a sine qua non to Congress's valid exercise of its Section 5 power.344
In the case of the ADA, the persistence and prevalence of governmental
discrimination against persons with disability and the unlikelihood that it would
dissipate overnight made selection of an automatic cut-off infeasible. The states have
permanent institutions in Washington to represent their interests in Congress and
assuredly have no difficulty getting Congress's attention. If the day comes that the
states think the ADA's ban on employment discrimination is no longer needed, they
can be expected to invite consideration of its repeal. But that day has not yet arrived,
as is evidenced by the decision of forty-two states not to support Alabama's quest in
Garrett.345
IV. IF GARRETT FALLS, WHAT REMAINS OF CONGRESS'S EFFORTS TO
PROTECT PERSONS wrrH DIsABILmES FROM STATE BEHAVIOR?
Let us assume that despite the arguments described in Part MII, the Supreme Court
rules in Garrett that the ADA is not a proper exercise of Congress's Section 5
powers, and thus that the Eleventh Amendment precludes Congress's authorization
ofprivate suits against states to enforce the employment provisions of the ADA. That
holding will not erase the states' obligations to obey the ADA, as those obligations
were imposed pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause power.346 How, then, Can
those obligations be enforced? That is the focus of this Part IV.
A. Suits by Individuals against States as Entities
A victory for the states in Garrett would not necessarily mean that individuals
cannot enforce their rights in private actions that name the state as a defendant At
least three alternate routes to the same end must be considered.
62 (2000)); City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997).
344 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644-45; City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
345 See supra note 18.
346 This was acknowledged in the Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1-2, Garrett (No. 99-1240).
See also Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Coils. & Univs. for N.E. 11. Univ., 207 F.3d 945,
945-50 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the ADA is not a proper exercise of Congress's Section 5
power, but acknowledging that Congress had "ample power under the Commerce Clause" to enact
the employment provisions of the ADA). As described supra at notes 195 & 200 and
accompanying text, the commercial character of employment brings it outside the constraints on
the Commerce Clause power articulated in Lopez and Morrison.
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1. State Waivers ofEleventh Amendment Immunity
The Supreme Court has consistently held that states may waive the immunity
from suit in federal court that the Eleventh Amendment otherwise confers. 347 Many
states have indicated that they support Congress's decision to authorize private suits
against states to enforce the ADA.348 It is predictable that a defeat for the respondents
in Garrett would prompt agitation for friendly states to waive their immunity and
consent to private suits in federal court to enforce the ADA. That surely could be
accomplished by the enactment of state legislation. But even without such legislation,
the Court has held that, if consistent with his or her powers under state law, a state's
attorney general can waive the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.349
2. Suits in State Court to Enforce the ADA
The Supreme Court held in Alden v. Maine350 that the federal Constitution does
not oblige states to entertain in their own courts private suits that are barred from
federal courts by the Eleventh Amendment.351 But nothing precludes state courts
from holding that, by reason of waivers of sovereign immunity in the past, the internal
law of their state provides state court jurisdiction over such suits. 352 Indeed, Judge
Easterbrook in Erickson suggested that as Illinois has consented to be sued in its
courts, the ADA can be enforced against it by private suit in state court 353
347 Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2199,2204-
11 (1999) (to be published at 527 U.S. 666 (1999)) (describing cases and emphasizing that the
intent to waive must be "unequivocally expressed").
34 8 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (showing that the states all supported passage
of ADA); supra note 18 (explaining that fourteen states joined an anicus curiae brief supporting
respondents in Garrett and twenty-eight more declined to join an amicus curiae brief supporting
petitioners).
349 Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
350 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (to be published at 527 U.S. 706 (1999)).
351 Id at 712.
352 If state law declares that a state agency may "sue or be sued, in any court of competent
jurisdiction," the Supreme Court will construe that as a waiver of sovereign immunity in state
courts, but not a consent to suit in federal court. Coll. Sav. Bank 527 U.S. at 676. The latter
requires "express[ ] consent[ ] to being sued in federal court." Id.
353 Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Coils. & Univs. for N.E. 111. Univ., 207 F.3d 945,
952 (7th Cir. 2000).
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3. Suits to Enforce Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
The ADA's employment provisions applicable to states were patterned after, and
closely resemble, the provisions of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.354 The only
difference is that the ADA is an across-the-board statute applicable to all states and
state agencies, while section 504 applies only to state programs that accept federal
monies. Section 504, as amended, requires that an entity accepting federal funds
expressly waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity to private suits in federal court
to enforce section 504. If the ADA is not properly grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is a fair conclusion that neither is section 504. But, that is not the end
of the inquiry respecting section 504, for the statute is independently grounded in
Congress's spending power.355 The Court has repeatedly held that Congress may
extract concessions from states as a condition to receipt of federal money that it could
not directly impose on nonconsenting states.356 The concession becomes in effect a
contractual obligation-the consideration for the federal monies that the federal
government would not provide absent that consideration.357
To be sure, the Court has hinted that there may be limits to Congress's ability to
extract concessions as the price for receiving federal monies. In the leading case,
South Dakota v. Dole, the Court stated that "our cases have suggested (without
significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they
are unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.' ' 358
The decisions to date, however, have been quite generous in finding the requisite
connection. In Dole, authored by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress
could condition the states' receipt of federal funds for highway construction upon the
state raising the drinking age to twenty-one. The connection-that raising the
drinking age to twenty-one would reduce highway accidents-was deemed
sufficient.359 At a minimum, this would seem to support, a fortiori, waivers of
354 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
355 Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1080 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding "that
Section 504 is a valid exercise of Congress's spending power").
356 The leading case is South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), described infra text
accompanying note 358-59. See also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,287
(1998); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1997); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
1, 31 (1981); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,480 (1977); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
145 (1992).
357 See generally Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
358 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)
(plurality opinion)).
359 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09.
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Eleventh Amendment immunity as to suits to enforce section 504 that are made as a
condition to receipt of federal monies that assist the state in treating, employing, or
otherwise providing services to persons with disabilities. 360
There is always the danger, of course, that the Court, as part of its present agenda
to get the federal government off the backs of the states, might shrink Congress's
power to extract concessions in exchange for the provision of federal monies. But
assuming that the Court does not retreat from its spending power jurisprudence,
section 504 wvill remain enforceable by private suit in federal court.361
B. Suits by Individuals against State Officials
1. The Doctrine ofEx parte Young
In a 1908 case, Exparte Young,3 62 the Supreme Court held that even though
states were not suable because of the Eleventh Amendment, individual state actors
could be sued and injunctions sought to prevent the violation of federal constitutional
or statutory rights.363 Although initially predicated on an ultra vires rationale-the
individual state official had no authorization from the state to violate the federal norm,
and thus should be individually accountable for his misconduct-that rationale
quickly dropped away, and the doctrine was applied regularly (especially during the
school desegregation era) to cases in which the individual actor plainly was
implementing the state's perceived interests. The doctrine thus evolved into a patent
"fiction," a device to secure injunctive relief against state action despite the Eleventh
Amendment.
The early cases, including Ex parte Young itself, involved injunctions of a
negative type: the actor was enjoined not to use his power to violate federal
360 See Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (upholding section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994), under Congress's spending power).
36 1 In Garrett, the plaintiffs' complaints alleged violations of section 504 as well as the ADA.
See Garrett v. Univ. ofAla. Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214, 1215 (2000). The Eleventh Circuit upheld
section 504 as proper Fourteenth Amendment legislation, and exempt from the Eleventh
Amendment for that reason. Id. at 1218-19. The state agencies challenged that ruling in their
petition for certiorari. See Petition for Certiorari at i, Garrett (No. 99-1240). Respondents
countered that, whether or not section 504 is properly grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, the
agencies had consented to suit in federal court coincident to taking federal funds related to
treatment of disability. Memorandum of Respondents [in Response to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari] at 8-15, Garrett (No. 99-1240). The Supreme Court granted certiorari only with respect
to the ADA and not with respect to the state agencies' challenge to section 504. Garrett v. Univ.
of Ala. Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214, 1215 (2000), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3654 (U.S. Apr. 17,
2000) (No. 99-1240).
362 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
363 Id. at 167.
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constitutional or statutory rights. Since compliance required nothing more than the
individual choice of the defendant, it was possible to envision the "fiction" as resting
on the idea that the suit was against the actor as an individual, not in his official
capacity. But by the time of the desegregation efforts of the 1960s (if not earlier), the
Court quite explicitly held that affirmative injunctions could be issued against state
actors-indeed, injunctions that required them to dip into the state treasury to finance
the relief that was ordered by the injunction. Plainly, the notion that the suit was
merely against the actor in his nonofficial capacity was no longer sustainable-only
in his official capacity could the state actor gain access to the state treasury. The
fiction thus became even more fanciful: this suit was not against the state, even
though the injunction issued required action that only the state (acting through its
official who was the defendant) could take.
In Edelman v. Jordan, an effort was made by a state to secure a reversal of this
doctrine, but the effort failed.364 In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court
acknowledged the incongruity of banning suits against states but enabling relief from
the states via orders addressed to state actors, but declared this to be history's
compromise, from which the Court would not retreat.365 Injunctive relief could be
obtained by suits against state officials, including relief that required the prospective
dipping into the state treasury. But, Edelman held, the Eleventh Amendment stood
as a bulwark against securing damage awards or other restrospective monetary relief
against these officials that would be payable from the state treasury.366 Of course,
damages could be awarded against the offending state official to be paid from his own
pocket But that is a decidedly inferior option: the individual may be judgment proof,
and in any event enjoys at least a qualified immunity that will make damages
unavailable in a wide swathe of cases.367
The positive side of the Edelman compromise-the availability of injunctive
relief that requires prospective monetary relief from the state treasury-was carried
yet a step further in Hutto v. Finney.368 The court there held that a plaintiff who
succeeds in an Exparte Young suit can secure an award of attomeys fees that will be
364 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
365 Id. at 669-70.
366 Id. at 678.
367 The leading Supreme Court decision is Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
See also Ruffino v. Sheahan, 218 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining current doctrine);
Vazquez, supra note 48, at 876-77:
Under current doctrine, an officer is immune from damage liability if the federal law he is
alleged to have violated was not 'clearly established' at the time of the alleged violation. As the
Court currently applies that standard, the officer is immune from damage liability unless the law
was clear at a fact-specific level.... Certainly, it leaves many violations of federal law unremedied.
368 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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enforced against the state treasury.369 To date, the Court has not retreated from the
Edelman compromise. So long as that compromise holds, Congress has power to
authorize suits against state officials seeking injunctive relief (and attorneys fees),
even to enforce statutes that are grounded solely on the Commerce Clause.
However, this does not automatically mean that such suits can be brought to
enforce the ADA against individual state actors. Congress has thepower to authorize
suits against public officials for injunctive relief and attorneys fees,370 but has
Congress exercised that power with respect to the ADA? There are two possible
sources for such an exercise: the ADA and § 1983. They will be examined seriatim.
a. The ADA
The ADA forbids discrimination by any "covered entity" defined as "an
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee. '371 "Employer" is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has 15 or more employees ... and any agent of such person."372
While the italicized words suggest that an agent of an employer is sepamtely obligated
to obey the ADA, the case law is weighted heavily against that interpretation.
The same definitions appear in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in
the ADEA. The Courts have generally construed the italicized language to have been
added merely to assure that employers will have respondeat superior liability for the
acts of their agents, and not to create a cause of action against the individual agent
The cases are collected and described in EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd.373
3 69 1ad at 700.
370 Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2263 (1999) (to be published at 527 U.S. 706 (1999))
(declaring that "certain suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers must therefore
be permitted if the Constitution is to remain the supreme law of the land"); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 693-700 (1978) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent the award of
attorney's fees against state corrections officers under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994)); Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908) (holding that suits
against state actors may be necessary to protect against state laws that violate constitutional rights).
371 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(2) (1994).
372 § 12111(5)(A).
373 55 F.3d 1276, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1995). See also generally Coddington v. Adelphi Univ.,
45 F. Supp.2d 211 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Sifre v. Dep't of Health, 38 F. Supp.2d 91 (D.P.R. 1999);
Cooke-Seals v. District of Columbia, 973 F. Supp. 184 (D.D.C. 1997); Cleveland v. KFC Nat'l
Mgmt. Co., 948 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ga. 1996). Contra Icampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 562
(D.R.I. 1996).
2001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
b. Section 1983
If the ADA itself does not authorize suits against individuals, does § 1983
provide an alternative basis for suing the officials? Section 1983 provides for suits
against public officials for deprivations of rights under federal law and the ADA is
such a law. But, alas, Seminole Tribe furnishes troublesome precedent here.374 After
holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit against the state, the Court went
on to hold that Ex parte Young could not be used to secure relief from a state
official.375 The statute contemplated suit only against the state, and prescribed a
"carefully crafted and intricate remedial scheme."376 A suit under Exparte Young
would expose the state official to remedies far exceeding those prescribed in the
statute.377 Congress having prescribed the lesser, the Court was unwilling to assume
that it intended the greater:
Here ... we have found that Congress does not have authority under the
Constitution to make the State suable in federal court .... Nevertheless, the fact that
Congress chose to impose upon the State a liability that is significantly more limited than
would be the liability imposed upon the state officer under Ex parte Young strongly
indicates that Congress had no wish to create the latter .... Nor are we free to rewrite the
statutory scheme in order to approximate what we think Congress might have wanted had
it known that [the suit against the state] was beyond its authority. If that effort is to be
made, it should be made by Congress, and not by the federal courts.378
The ADA's enforcement scheme is in some respects more limited than that
available under § 1983. Damages are capped under Title I of the ADA, but not under
§ 1983. Moreover, if the weight of authority is correct that state officials are not
suable as "employers" under the ADA, Congress in the ADA chose ndt to expose
individuals to monetary liability at all. For these reasons, it is doubtful that the Court
would tolerate § 1983 actions seeking damages for ADA violations. (Of course,
Congress would be free to amend the ADA to achieve this result.)
On the other hand, suits against state officials seeking injunctive relief that would
have been available against the state, but for the Eleventh Amendment problem,
would have some chance of surviving even without an amendment to the ADA. In
those suits, the only remedies the plaintiff would recover are remedies the ADA
plainly contemplated.
374 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
375 Id. at 53.
376 Id. at 73-74.
377 Id. at 74-75.
378 Id. at 75-76.
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C. Suits by the Federal Government against States
Another incongruity of the Court's compromise respecting federalism is the
consistent holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits brought by
the federal government.379 Under existing law, the provisions of the ADA
empowering the Department of Justice (DOJ) to sue states for violations of the ADA
would survive a ruling in Garrett that the ADA violates the Eleventh Amendment.
The only tricky question is whether the DOJ would be entitled to seek damages
against the state of the type that is not available under the Edelman compromise. The
ansxver would seem to be "yes," judging from decisions under Title VII.3 80
If the Court holds in Garrett that individuals cannot sue states, but adheres to its
consistent position that the federal government can sue states, we arrive at the
ultimate preposterousness of the current quest to resurrect federalism. To achieve M
enforcement of the ADA (and of the ADEA and other statutes that are axed by the
Kimel doctrine), Congress would have to greatly enlarge the federal executive branch
to enable it to bring all the suits that would otherwise have been brought by
individuals. A doctrine that leads to massive expansion ofthe federal government and
vastly increased occasions in which the federal government is suing states in federal
courts and securing compulsive relief against states, hardly comports with the "equal
sovereign" picture that fuels the Court's current agenda. The Court would have
outlawed limited skirmishes, while authorizing nuclear war. Viewed as a matter of
principle, the quest is demonstrably quixotic.
But if one views the Court's motivation as pragmatic, rather than driven by
principle, the picture changes. It is unlikely that Congress would authorize the
enormous sums necessary to finance this nuclear war. Indeed, even if a particularly
sympathetic Congress did so, it is unlikely that that momentum would be sustained
year after year, as each succeeding budget is considered. The Court's Eleventh
Amendment doctrine thus deprives Congress of the ability to decide, once and for all,
to authorize across-the-board litigation against states who violate the ADA and to rely
on private attorneys general to enforce the statute. Rather, Congress would have to
379 West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 (1987) (finding that "States have no
sovereign immunity as against the Federal Government'S; United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S.
128, 140-41 (1965) (citation omitted):
[N]othing in this or any other provision of the Constitution prevents or has ever been seriously
supposed to prevent a State's being sued by the United States. The United States in the past has in
many cases been allowed to file suits in this and other courts against States... with or without
specific authorization from Congress.
See also Vazquez, supra note 48, at 859-60 (stating that suits by the federal government against
state officials are left open by the Eleventh Amendment).
380 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (showing the Department
of Justice pursuing relief for individuals victimized by a pattern and practice of discrimination);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971) (same).
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decide each year to commit enormous federal resources in order to secure
enforcement. That is a sure prescription for reducing the volume of suits that states
will have to defend, at least over time.
The requirement of federal enforcement will achieve that reduction in volume in
yet another way: it will insert a federal enforcement agency as a screener of which
suits have merit. The federal government will have to determine that the suit has merit
before it is brought and some unmeritorious suits that might have been brought by
individuals will not be filed by the federal government. Of course, if Congress
thought this screening device was a sensible idea, it could have inserted it into the
ADA, as it has in some other federal statutes.381 The Eleventh Amendment enables
the Court, rather than Congress, to make this policy choice, and to make it in favor
of a screening function that will lower the volume of cases the federal courts must
entertain.
V. CONCLUSION: WILL THE MISCHIEF THAT
KIMEL REPRESENTS ENDURE?
Kimel is a fait-accompli. A piece of the ADEA has been stricken. Garrett and the
ADA may be next (and then, perhaps, the FMLA, disparate impact under Title VI,
Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act, and so forth). Has the Court imposed an enduring
limit on Congress's ability to bring states to heel? Two considerations cast doubt
First, this line of decisions flows entirely from Seminole Tribe, a 5-4 decision,
that reversed the Union Gas holding that Congress has the power to authorize
individual suits against states to enforce legislation enacted under Congress's Article
I powers.382 Four current Justices have repeatedly signaled that they will reverse
Seminole Tribe at the first opportunity, if they secure a like-minded fiffi vote.3 83 It
is not inevitable that Seminole Tribe will survive President Bush's appointments.
Adherence to Seminole Tribe's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is unlikely
to be a litmus test for choosing Supreme Court Justices, as Seminole Tribe has no
constituency (except for five Justices presently on the Court). Certainly the states are
not a constituency, as they have shown themselves quite content to be covered by the
laws the Court is striking down. Republican judicial appointees would not predictably
all share the mindset of the current five on this particular issue-witness the
381 Under the National Labor Relations Act, employees must file charges with the National
Labor Relations Board's General Counsel, who alone may issue a complaint against the party
charged. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(d), 160 (1994). Similarly, employees who believe their employer has
retaliated against them for pursuing enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act must
file their complaints with the Secretary of Labor, who alone may initiate litigation against the
employer. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1994).
382 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
383 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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Republican legislators who supported enactment of the bills authorizing individual
suits against states, and the prominent Republican leaders (including Senators Hatch
and Dole, and former President Bush) who have joined anicus curiae briefs opposing
the states' quest to be shielded from such Suits. 3 8 4
Second, even without reversal of Seminole Tribe, Congress has the power to do
much to secure enforcement of these statutes. It can use its spending power to secure
waivers of the Eleventh Amendment to the maximum extent consistent with the
Court's spending power rulings. It can authorize suits against state officials for
enforcement of all such statutes, thus ensuring the availability ofExparte Young. It
can overcome one of the problems with traditional Exparte Young lawsuits--the
qualified immunity enjoyed by state officials-by expressly declaring that the
officials will not enjoy a qualified immunity (or, at least, narrowing the scope of the
immunity so that it is less protective than that under existing Supreme Court law).385
Additionally, Congress can appropriate more monies to enable federal enforcement
agencies to bring at least some of the lawsuits that otherwise would have been
brought by individuals.
Time will tell whether Congress has the will to wage the continuing battle with
the Supreme Court in these areas. The Supreme Court enjoys an institutional
advantage in these battles, as its small size enables it to act cohesively. But Congress
has shown that when poked in the eye enough, it can harness its sprawling body to
overturn Supreme Court mischief.386
PoSTcIInT: THE SuPREME COURT'S DECISION IN GARRETT
Just days before this article was to go to press, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Garrett, holding, by the now-familiar 5-4 vote, that Title I of the ADA
violates the Eleventh Amendment insofar as it authorizes private suits against
states.387 The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concluded that
384 Seesupra notes 4,5 and accompanying text at page 4.
385 The qualified immunitythe Court has read into § 1983 is based on Congress's presumed
intent, not any constitutional foundation. See generally supra note 48.
386 See, for example, the Civil Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (overturning
several Supreme Court interpretations of Title VII, including those contrary to the intent of
§ 20003-12).
387 Univ. ofAla. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, No. 99-1240,2001 U.S. LEXIS 1700 (U.S. Feb. 21,
2000). The Court refrained from addressing the constitutionality of the comparable provision in
Title II of the ADA, instead dismissing as improvidently granted the portion of the writ of certiorari
that embraced that issue. Garrett, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 1700, at *8, n. 1. The Court assigned, as the
reason for this action, the insettled question whether employment is covered by Title li-an issue
on which the circuits are in conflict, see supra note 12 and accompanying text, but which was not
among the issues on which the state agencies had sought certiorari in Garrett. 2001 U.S. LEXIS
1700, at *8, n.1. It is also possible, of course, that one or more of the five Justices in the majority
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Title I of the ADA is not a proper exercise of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
power. The majority found two defects: (1) Congress did not compile a record
sufficient to demonstrate that there was a pattern of unconstitutional state
employment discrimination against persons with disabilities,388 and, (2) even if it had,
the adoption of disparate impact and reasonable accommodation provisions would not
be appropriate responses to such discrimination.389
The majority opinion resolves the doubt expressed in the body of this article,390
whether the current Court has retreated from the principles announced in the "first
quarte' (i.e., the voting rights decisions from 1966-1980) defining Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment powers. The current Court unquestionably has retreated,
most notably in its failure to accord the deference to Congress that was the hallmark
of those decisions, and in its application of "heightened scrutiny" to Congress's
findings and remedies. As Justice Breyer lamented in his opinion for the four
dissenters, "it is difficult to understand why the Court, which applies 'minimum
"rational-basis" review' to statutes that burden persons with disabilities... subjects
to far stricter scrutiny a statute that seeks to help those same individuals."391
That retreat is evident in both of the Court's holdings. With respect to the first-
the inadequacy of the record to support Congress's finding of a pattern of
unconstitutional behavior by the states-the majority's approach was aptly
characterized by Justice Breyer, speaking for the four dissenters: the majority
"review[ed] the congressional record as if it were an administrative agency record."392
Congress was not permitted to infer, from the fact of rampant societal
discrimination-findings that the majority acknowledged were amply supported in
the congressional record393-- that state actors were not immune from this prevalent
virus. 394 Neither was Congress entitled to infer, from widespread behavior by states
disadvantaging persons with disabilities, that state actors had not been motivated by
rational concerns in visiting that disadvantage.395 This is a far cry from the deference
to congressional fact-finding reflected in the first quartet
doubted that the same fate (a decree of unconstitutionality) should be visited on Title II.
388 Id., at *22-28.
389 Id, at *28-33.
390 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
391 Garrett, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 1700, at *57 (emphases in original).
3 92 Id, at *37 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, JJ.).
393 Id., at *23-24.
394 Id., at *24-25.
395 Id., at *29-30. This holding was buttressed by an unprecedented narrow interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause. The majority opinion appears to hold that the Clause is not violated
when a state actor takes action disadvantaging persons with disabilities that is motivated solely by
"negative attitudes" or irrational 'Tear," so long as the state, when later challenged in court, can
proffer a rational basis upon which that action could have been motivated. Id., at *4. The majority
appears to believe that pretextual behavior offends the Constitution only when based on a
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With respect to the second holding-that even were there a pattern of state
discrimination against persons with disabilities that violated the Constitution, the
ADA's remedies would not be congruent and proportional-the Court majority
showed no deference whatever to Congress's discretion in formulating remedies. As
reasonable accommodation and avoidance of disparate impact are not themselves
constitutionally required, Congress cannot adopt them in response to a pattern of
unconstitutional behavior.396 The utility of these remedies as prophylactics against
invidiously-motivated state action was not even discussed, let alone refuted, in the
majority opinion.
The only consolation for the disability community in the Court's opinion are the
declarations of what the holding does not undo. "[T]he Eleventh Amendment does
not extend its immunity to units of local government.... [and so] [t]hese entities are
subject to private claims for damages under the ADA.' 397 And, with respect to the
states themselves, "Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the
States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money
damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex
parte Young. -.. 39
classification that merits heightened scrutiny.
3961d, at *6.
397 ]d, at *23.
398 Id., at *33 n.9 (construingExParte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
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